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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Title of Thesis: 
 
 
 
AN ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF MACINTYRE’S CRITIQUE  
OF THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE  
ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 
 
 
 
Modernity has generally been interpreted as a radical expression of human 
progress in the light of the advances of modern science and technology. 
According to Alasdair MacIntyre, however, modernity is a project “doomed to 
failure”.  Given the progressive-linearity of the modern model of rationality, the 
past has, in principle, been ruled out as a source of moral-political wisdom and 
guidance.  From the perspective of modernity, the present (as the progressive 
moment of the future) has therefore nothing to learn from past traditions .  
MacIntyre contends that the moral confusion within modernity comes from its 
loss of telos, mediated in terms of the past.  Modernity therefore harbours a 
paradox based on its inability to provide a philosophical justification for 
establishing the possibility of human solidarity in the present, while 
simultaneously affirming its faith in the future.  In this regard, MacIntyre’s work is 
an important contribution to the philosophical debate on modernity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Terms:     Enlightenment;  modernity;  emotivism;  morality;  essential 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction:  An overview of MacIntyre’s views and objectives 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the question of modernity, with 
particular reference to the ethical challenges posed by an epoch whose self-
definition is derived primarily from its fundamental commitment to “progress” as 
the ultimate expression of reason.  This work is a response to the many ethical 
problems and diverse points of view that have emerged as a result of the 
numerous changes brought about by the modern transformation of society.  From 
the perspective of modernity, the present is interpreted as a progressive moment 
whose realization will occur in a future that is, by definition, radically 
incommensurable with the past. The past, in turn, is usually interpreted as an 
unchanging (pre-rational) way of life, guided by mysticism, superstition and 
ignorance.  This characterization of the past is based on modernity’s association 
of reason with the advances of modern science and technology.  The speed at 
which modern society has experienced transformation and development in the 
wake of the Industrial Revolution, along with its general acceptance of liberalism 
as the moral-political framework of human interaction, have been the major 
causes of the alienation suffered by the “ordinary” modern individual, whose 
sense of “self” has been dictated by a general obsession with self-
aggrandizement, which has invariably taken the form of a never-ending 
competition and conflict with other individuals , on the one hand, as well as the 
form of domination of nature, on the other hand .  This sense of self-
aggrandizement has resulted in constant upheavals in the capitalist free market 
system, and alienation in the workplace, as well as the depletion of some of the 
natural resources so vital to the survival of the human species on earth.  From 
the perspective of modernity, the sense of self (of being human) is synonymous 
with the autonomous individual, motivated generally by a rationality of self-
interest, the primary basis of moral decision-making. 
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The work of Alasdair MacIntyre represents a very important contribution, as well 
as serious challenge, to the contemporary debate on the philosophical 
significance and nature of the question of modernity.  His views on the question 
of modernity as expressed in his major work, After Virtue, 1985, will provide the 
primary focus of my thesis; his analyses of various ethical theories, primarily 
emotivism and related issues, will be examined as models to demonstrate the 
moral dilemmas confronting modernity.   
 
In my opinion, After Virtue is a significant work in view of the fact that it attempts 
to address the question of modernity from an ethical perspective.  For MacIntyre, 
the question of “progress” must therefore not be addressed solely in terms of 
scientific-technical rationality, but also in terms of human solidarity – beyond the 
imperatives of economic and moral self-interest.  Modernity must therefore face 
the challenge of defining the “good life” in a manner reminiscent of the discipline 
emanating from traditional “religious life”, fully mindful of the fact that “Reason” 
rather than “God” represents the highest authority.  How will the creatures of 
modernity meet this challenge?  It is this question that has motivated me to 
explore the “project of Enlightenment”.  I am particularly concerned with 
investigating the implications of modernity’s self-imposed undertaking to break off 
all ties with the past as a legitimate source of justification for its central values 
and general moral orientation. 
   
Individuals frequently seem to have forgotten or, at worst, discarded what is 
basically known to be right or wrong; a system of values appears to be absent.  
Within the context of modernity, ethical issues that previously were considered to 
be unproblematic, and generally acceptable, are in principle open to dispute, thus 
emphasizing the need for the development of an authoritative foundation of moral 
justification capable of convincing individuals of radically different views that 
consensus born of  mutual respect  provides the only “rational” way of dealing 
with moral questions that lack the foundation of certainty that we normally 
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associate with the world of science.  In the absence of such certainty, however, 
modernity must learn to live with conflict and disagreement in a morally 
acceptable way, if it is not to succumb to what has become the modern malaise 
of “anything goes, as long as it works for you”, the primary cause of uncertainty.    
 
As far as MacIntyre is concerned, modernity’s moral disintegration stems from its 
dogmatic dismissal of the past as a source of moral instruction and 
enlightenment.  For him, the critical evaluation and acknowledgement of 
historical traditions are crucial to developing a meaningful and more humane 
sense of self.  It also provides a normative context for dealing with moral conflict, 
thus eliminating the destructive impact of an arbitrary form of reasoning on the 
moral life of a community, in which family life may still be viewed as a primary 
source of human solidarity.  In his endeavour to make sense of the modern 
process of change, MacIntyre reminds us that we need to be conscious of the 
fact that we are indebted to past generations (our ancestors) and that historical 
factors do influence human relationships because people are principally social 
animals and, therefore, tradition and political activities are part of a person’s 
social development.   
 
MacIntyre’s main contention in After Virtue is that the modern person has lost the 
capacity for leading a meaningful life.  He claims that modernity’s entire 
conceptual scheme is fragmented and, in line with this reasoning, he states that 
‘we have lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.’ 
(MacIntyre 1985: 2)  In an attempt to counteract this situation, he maintains that it 
is of vital importance that society reinstates disciplined moral actions where 
individuals can once again achieve true freedom and thereby gain fulfilment in 
living more meaningful lives.  He repeatedly tells us that it is vital to take into 
consideration concrete settings in order to arrive at an accurate judgement about 
any incident.   
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According to MacIntyre, another persistent problem in connection with modernity 
is that the individual has become unmindful of his or her telos (essential “nature” 
to be realized as an individual project pursued in concert with others).  He claims 
that rehabilitating the concept of telos could possibly encourage the individual to 
reaffirm his or her true self in the knowledge that an ethical life is of universal 
significance.  He also adds that no living creature can divorce himself or herself 
entirely from his or her unique circumstances, since each person in some 
manner or another is normally dependent on other beings in the pursuit of self-
knowledge.  The intricacies of how change and co-existence with others occur 
are part of the tapestry of history.  MacIntyre’s examination of a broad range of 
subjects reinforces his philosophical views that humans are touched by a 
diversity of events, especially as they readjust to changing circumstances.  He 
declares that, in modernity’s case, these endless changes and unpredictable 
moral dilemmas have contributed extensively towards the downward trend of 
ethical beliefs and hence moral behaviour.   
 
In order to gain a clearer understanding of MacIntyre’s statement concerning the 
serious predicaments of ethics, it is important to evaluate the ethical theories that 
have enjoyed general acceptance within the current conceptual framework of 
modernity, namely, the theories of emotivism and utilitarianism.  In this regard 
one may ask: what is the rationale behind specific actions, for example, why are 
some actions thought to be good in certain circumstances whereas in other 
similar situations viewed as bad?  It is apparent that this state of affairs is 
frequently caused by the fact that other cultural communities or individuals have 
established their own rules or ideas about solving various problems, and that a 
different or unfamiliar response invariably leads to conflicting assessments or 
merely unacceptable resolutions.  These issues in turn raise the need for an 
inquiry into the nature of human rights with a view to inquiring into the possibility 
of establishing their “universal” nature in the face of the subjectivistic nature of 
the ethics of modernity. 
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For MacIntyre, a major source of modernity’s moral crisis is indeed the theory of 
emotivism, which encourages arbitrary solutions that undoubtedly lead to 
relativism and to the individual’s attitude of entitlement, on the one hand.  The 
theory of utilitarianism, on the other hand, is equally unacceptable insofar as it 
encourages a technical approach to questions of morality: if a particular course of 
action can produce the desired results, then it is “right”, if not, then it is “wrong”.  
From this perspective, the question of the “good life” as a function of a 
particular’s community’s moral foundations is reduced to the individual’s “right” to 
be protected against interference from the community (its traditions), the state, 
and the “other”.   
 
The question of modernity will be examined against the background of 
MacIntyre’s central claim that the project of Enlightenment has failed, that indeed 
it was doomed to fail right from the start.  In reaction agains t the destructive 
individualism of the modern epoch, MacIntyre seeks to address modernity from 
the perspective of its past history (histories) in order to emphasize the point that 
the individual is more than a consumer or an insignificant statistic in the 
anonymous regime of modern technology, bureaucracy and capitalism.  Against 
this view, MacIntyre argues that the narrative of each person’s life is the product 
of what has occurred before and this historical-cultural legacy, in turn, defines 
who the person was, is and what he or she may become.  The individual, 
conceptualised as a member of a community, draws his or her inspiration for 
moral excellence from many diverse historical figures throughout the centuries.  
Indeed, the indebtedness of society to its legacy is referred to by Robert Pippin in 
his book, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of 
European High Culture.  He mentions that John Salisbury writes in his 
Metalogicon (1159) as follows: 
 
We frequently know more, not because we have moved ahead by 
our own natural ability, but because we are supported by the 
mental strength of others, and possess riches that we have 
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inherited from our forefathers. … we see more and farther than our 
predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater 
height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their 
gigantic stature. (Pippin 1991: 18)  
 
Throughout his writings, MacIntyre mentions that the fundamental factors that 
have led to the failure of the Enlightenment Project include, firstly, the fact that 
modern society has denied its legacy, secondly, promotion of an emotivist culture 
with its various disadvantageous ramifications, namely, relative and random 
assumptions as well as the secularization of society, thirdly, the autonomous  
individual’s dissociation from the community and tradition has left modernity in a 
state of moral crisis with no frame of reference and, finally, the theory of 
liberalism’s intense focus on rational self-interest has set in motion 
circumstances that have created discord and uncertainty in judging precisely 
what is really right or wrong conduct.  Here, MacIntyre argues that to divorce a 
citizen completely from a basic moral ethos can never be conducive to living a 
“good life”.   
 
The central focus of this thesis is modernity, the so-called period of radical 
Enlightenment.  Factors that will be investigated are the sociological (and 
historical) as well as the philosophical context for understanding and evaluating 
the period in question.  While MacIntyre ackno wledges that tremendous 
advances have been made in all areas of knowledge during the Enlightenment 
period, he is especially critical of the fact that the scientific-technical process of 
reasoning (instrumental rationality) has been regarded as the sole means of 
acquiring knowledge.  In view of the transformation of modern society into a 
secularized social structure, modernity has produced a culture that no longer 
feels the need to be dominated by the authority of the Church, traditional 
customs and beliefs.  This rejection of the legitimacy of the authority of history 
(as a source of the collective memory and as a function of human solidarity) has 
resulted in the development of a liberal political tradition whose future “progress” 
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is defended to justify modernity’s collective amnesia and indifference to the moral 
question of social and historical justice.  The modern focus on individual 
autonomy within the context of moral-political liberalism constitutes a constant 
distortion and threat to human autonomy in a meaningful sense.  In MacIntyre’s 
view, liberalism has simply promoted modernity’s moral degeneration.  The 
traditional moral-orientated society has been replaced by a modern rule-
regulated society, in which the question of the collective is simply no longer a 
priority.   
 
For the purpose of demonstrating his position on ethics within the context of 
modernity, MacIntyre presents the reader with a very disturbing symbolic tale 
concerning the disintegration of moral values.  He claims that with society’s 
overemphasis on science and technical-strategic reasoning, as the primary tools 
to attain knowledge, human beings are struggling to come to terms with ethical 
principles.  He is critical of modernity’s methods of trying to make sense of all the 
chaos by its combination of aspects that are usually logically incompatible.  This 
point is well stated in the following quote, ‘What we possess, if this view is true, 
are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts 
from which their significance derived’. (MacIntyre 1985: 2)  At this point, it should 
be taken into account that to determine what ethics is about it is not sufficient to 
offer an exact definition.  In other words, it is essential first of all to  ponder upon 
the nature of virtue (moral excellence), as the ancient Greeks once did under the 
guidance of the great ancient African-Egyptian moral and spiritual imperatives of 
cosmic-human order and harmony.  More to the point, MacIntyre is of the view 
that the Enlightenment Project has failed because it cannot provide the kind of 
moral (teleological) guidance that one finds in Aristotelian ethics.  In his attempt 
to address the problem of ethical thinking within the context of modernity, 
MacIntyre’s position invariably vacillates between two poles of tension: on the 
one hand, he wants to place moral thinking on a rational foundation that goes 
beyond the individualism of the liberal tradition; on the other hand, he wants to 
defend the uniqueness of “the community”  (the communitarian tradition) in order 
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to avoid the trap of false universalism.  MacIntyre’s thinking in this regard is 
obviously in sympathy with the communitarian approach.  Linked to his notion of 
community-living is MacIntyre’s preoccupation with tradition, as he is of the 
opinion that without a return to tradition, meaningful moral interaction is not 
possible .  At the root of MacIntyre’s position is the assumption that tradition 
brings about some form of unity; it offers a frame of reference in which moral 
thinking can be grounded.  Furthermore, customary practices and communal 
lifestyles enable a person to have a sense of belonging , as well as have an 
opportunity to realize that he or she has a unique identity in view of his or her 
social roles and interaction with others.  For MacIntyre, the historical and the 
traditional, informed by the collective processes of education and socialization, 
provide the unavoidable and inescapable starting-point of each individual’s life, 
conceptualized as a tapestry of “reinventable” narratives emanating from the 
past.   
 
In accordance with the foregoing observations and explanations, the subject 
matter of each chapter is presented hereunder.  
 
I commence my discussion of MacIntyre’s critique of modernity in Chapter Two 
by presenting the historical and philosophical aspects of the Enlightenment 
Project.  In Section One of this chapter, I will focus on the privileged status of 
(philosophical) reason as the foundation of all knowledge claims, scientific-
technical as well as moral-political knowledge claims.  Inspired by a radical sense 
of self-consciousness of a “new” age, I will demonstrate how modern reason has 
become bogged down in a scientistic (positivistic) definition of itself, thereby 
condemning the rational potential of modernity to the level of the technological 
developments of modern science.  The impact of scientific methodology, with 
Newton as a key figure, will be considered from this perspective.   In Section Two  
of this chapter, the most important representatives of modernity, Descartes and 
Kant, will be critically examined with specific reference to their respective 
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foundationalist epistemological models, aimed at achieving certainty and hence 
true knowledge.   
 
The purpose of Chapter Three is to focus on MacIntyre’s criticism of modernity.  
Herein, I highlight the reasons for MacIntyre’s fundamental claim that modernity 
is a project that was doomed to fail.  I also consider MacIntyre’s views on 
modernity’s moral degeneration, with particular reference to his critique of the 
ethical theory of emotivism as an appropriate theory for the normative framework 
of modernity.  Together with the negative effect of an emotivistic culture on 
modern morality, utilitarianism will also be evaluated concerning its emphasis on 
the ideas of rights and usefulness.   
 
In Chapter Four, I discuss MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism.  I will evaluate his 
argument that liberalism reduces questions about morality to the narrow sphere 
of the “self” and, as such, fails to provide an objective and intelligible or rational 
basis for assessing moral claims.  In the light of the above assertions, MacIntyre 
suggests that a restructuring of Aristotelian principles for a good life is a probable 
solution to the moral crisis of modernity, since it can provide guidelines for 
reintroducing the idea of “unity” with specific reference to the inestimable value of 
tradition as the cultural repository of virtuous practices.  At this juncture, I would 
like to mention that MacIntyre openly acknowledges his debt to Frederich 
Nietzsche, as one of the most important critics of modernity.  It is well known that 
Nietzsche openly condemned modernity as nothing more than an aggressive 
“will-to-power”, and that all morality is just a façade to mask the manipulative and 
destructive impulses of human behaviour.  For Nietzsche, when morality loses its 
legitimacy (when “God is dead”), humankind loses its reason to be “good”.  
Unlike Nietzsche, however, MacIntyre is of the opinion that the salvation of 
modern man lies in its potential to remember the past; there is no talk for 
MacIntyre of “learning to forget” and “new beginnings”, as we find in Nietzsche.  
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Of special relevance, because of modernity’s perspective and never-ending call 
for renewal, in Chapter Five, I propose to present an alternati ve method to 
resolve problematic issues to accommodate the modern mindset, namely, 
Habermas’s dialogical approach.  Communication, as a major method to arrive at 
a common understanding of not simply problematic issues but also about shared 
experiences, is examined.   Within this context, Habermas structures a rational 
model of intersubjective discourse aimed at comprehending and interpreting our 
lifeworld; simultaneously never losing sight of the fact that the practical nature of 
conversation should be addressed.  What is more, with reference to modernity’s 
mode of thinking Habermas states that validity claims accompany communicative 
action, defined as a means of attaining understanding about various 
interpretations  and arriving at consensus.  It is as a result of an exchange of 
ideas that humans can connect with each other and establish whether a 
discussion is rational and that a logical process of reasoning has been followed.  
Finally, in this chapter Habermas looks at the status of modernity, in order to 
establish whether it is indeed a failed enterprise (as maintained by MacIntyre) or, 
in keeping with his (Habermas’s) outlook, modernity is definitely an “unfinished 
project”.  
 
Against the background of the amazing scientific discoveries and new ideas, 
MacIntyre examines the decline of morality and factors that lead to this situation.  
The final chapter (Chapter Six) is, therefore, a brief concluding summary of the 
chapters of this thesis.  Modernity is recognized as a period that severed all ties 
with its predecessors and which has directed its energies into an outpouring of 
new dreams.  In order to remove the uncertainties created by the changing 
environment a new consciousness has emerged.  Reason has become the 
guiding tenet to acquire all knowledge.  The commencement and dominance of 
scientific discoveries are evident as proof of humankind’s release from 
preconceptions and ignorance.  Key figures in this liberating process are 
Descartes, Newton and Kant (their respective contributions are discussed in 
Chapter Two).  The scientific community has undertaken to solve the insecurities 
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of humankind by establishing a single methodology to attain all knowledge 
through reason and in the process has argued that the social sciences cannot be 
investigated in a similar manner.  Instrumental rationality has made its mark often 
to the detriment of human dignity.  This is an extremely disturbing problem for 
MacIntyre .  According to MacIntyre, the fundamental transformations of 
perception in all areas of social structures and belief systems lead to the collapse 
of morality.  And, it is within this setting that MacIntyre voices his criticism of 
modernity (in Chapter Three).  For him, further aspects that have caused the 
downfall of the Enlightenment Project are: first and foremost, an emotivistic 
culture created by the autonomous individual who is essentially interested in the 
“self” and materialistic gains; second, utilitarianism has based moral conduct on 
what is most useful; third, disregard of traditional practices eventually has 
promoted moral turmoil and disregard of the human being’s telos.  In view of 
these factors and MacIntyre’s conviction that historical facets are interwoven into 
society’s consciousness, he suggests a reinvestment in Aristotelian ethics and 
the ideals of the polis (in Chapter Four).  However, taking the outlook of the 
modern individual into consideration, I propose to offer a different approach to 
MacIntyre’s way of thinking, namely, Habermas’s dialogical approach (in Chapter 
Five).  Habermas’s theory of communication offers a compelling alternative to 
MacIntyre’s method to resolve modernity’s problematic concerns.  Both 
Habermas and Gadamer emphasize the relevance of understanding to interpret 
the lifeworld of the agent.  Aside from this fact, there remain unanswered 
questions, for example, whether reason is the sole factor upon which to ground 
morality.  However, despite the various arguments and counter-arguments, it will 
also become apparent that there is a necessity for a system of values in 
modernity, and open debate certainly appears to be a positive means to attain 
this end.  
 
1.2  Conclusion 
If one considers former societies, that is, more “traditional” societies, modernity 
seems to have moved off in another direction.  For instance, the manne r in which 
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authority was accepted in the Middle Age differs significantly from the modern 
approach to authority.  Previously, what was decreed by the church or monarchy 
was looked upon as being law; nothing could be questioned.  However, now 
everything is questioned and in many respects rightly so, since even religion has 
also brought about questionable conditions, as a result of dogmatic belief 
systems and superstitious notions that have, in turn, resulted in untold  suffering 
and death to millions of people. Taking into consideration the situation of 
morality, however, MacIntyre argues that it is essential to offer “good” reasons as 
the legitimating basis of moral conduct.  It is of fundamental importance to 
recognize that moral actions should be reinstated in a manner that is enriching to 
humankind, not in terms of material possessions for the  (individual) consumer 
operating within an economic system of capitalism, but for the benefit of the 
community as a whole.  In the chapters that follow, I intend to demonstrate my 
fundamental claim, namely, that whilst I appreciate the enormous significance of 
MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, I do not agree with him that modernity is 
necessarily doomed to failure.  
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Chapter Two 
Modernity:  A new consciousness of time 
 
Section One 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I propose to examine factors that relate to the historical and 
philosophical development of modernity.  This chapter will consist of two 
sections.  In the first section, special emphasis will be given to the development 
of a new historical consciousness of time which arose in the wake of the impact 
of the Scientific Revolution, the cornerstone of modernity and thus the key to the 
modern conception of reason and rationality.  In the second section, I will discuss 
modernity in the light of arguably two of its most important representatives, 
namely, René Descartes and Immanuel Kant.  My discussion of these two 
sections will provide the context for my basic position, namely, that modernity, 
when emphatically associated with the scientific model of rationality, leads one to 
doubt the possibility of understanding morality in rational terms, thus contributing 
to the dominance of a rather one-dimensional (scientific-technical) conception of 
rationality, which undermines the possibility of providing a rational basis for 
approaching ethical questions within the conceptual framework of modernity. 
                             
The era of modernity, as understood today, commenced in the seventeenth 
century.  At the outset it must be stated that by definition the word “modern” 
implies “new”, and in keeping with this notion, modernity does not uphold or 
advocate anything that belongs to the past, more specifically to the traditional 
social order of pre-modern ages.  With the advent of the advances made by 
modern science and technology, the values of traditional society simply became 
irrelevant.  This age should, therefore, be seen as a new beginning and as an 
emancipation from a metaphysically-inspired otherworldly orientation to a more 
secularized universe which could now be understood and exploited in scientific 
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terms to the advantage of modern “Enlightened man”.   The modern subject must 
therefore adapt to the secularization of a cultural ethos in which science was 
given the authority to expose “the sacred” as the product of human immaturity.     
 
It is important to point out that the authority of science is based on the 
assumption that science can assure the modern subject of a rational 
epistemological foundation of certainty in terms of which to understand the 
objective “external” reality “out there”, on the one hand, and the “inner” subjective 
reality of moral thinking, on the other hand.  A model of reason, dominated by a 
scientific model of reasoning could therefore dismiss the achievements of other 
“non-modern” cultures as the product of irrationality, myth and superstition.  The 
position of the defender of a modernity, defined as the vehicle of scientific 
thinking, is therefore that modern man must sever all ties with history and 
tradition as a precondition of universal enlightenment and progress.  
 
2.1.1 The secularization of time  
Basically, the most fundamental event that sets apart the ancient world from the 
modern world is the remarkable momentum at which the discipline of science has 
progressed and has influenced all aspects of knowledge about the natural world.  
Those thinkers anxious to find answers to the riddle of the universe could now 
avail themselves of the resources of the Age of Science.  From this perspective, 
as illustrated in the works of Francis Bacon, for example, the modern inductive 
method of experimental reasoning represented the paradigmatic approach to 
knowledge and truth.  Bacon’s statement that an empirical approach was 
significant “to balance purely rational considerations” confirms this standpoint. 
(Caws 1967: 340) 
 
As stated above, modernity is a reaction against the authority of the Church and 
thus seeks to replace the authority of the latter with the authority of science as 
the only legitimate basis for the investigation of knowledge and truth.  The 
modern epoch had arrived, that is, a new consciousness of time had emerged 
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that emphasized predominantly the conception of scientific reason as a 
foundation for the realization of all knowledge.   
 
The authority of science is definitely very different from the authority of the 
Church because scientific methods originate primarily from intellectual 
understanding based on discoveries and observation within nature, where truth 
and knowledge can either by confirmed or disconfirmed simply by “looking at the 
facts”.  The authority of the Church, by contrast, relies on the dogmatic assertion 
and revelation of divine truth, which serves as a basis for legislating on a 
hierarchical system of power that demands (blind) faith in the leaders of the 
Church.  This authority of the Church cannot therefore be accommodated within 
the worldview of modernity because the modern subject can only acknowledge 
reason as the legitimate authority of truth, and when reason is restricted to a 
scientific conceptual framework, the question of morality does indeed poses an 
enormous challenge to the defenders of modern reason.     
 
Owing to the emancipation from authority and customary belief systems, prior 
constraints diminished.  As the Church’s restrictions diminished, morality was 
relegated to a lesser position that frequently resulted in disturbing dilemmas and 
confusion, given the lack of an authoritative moral compass within the ethos of 
modernity.   Besides, with the elevation of subjectivity as the only legitimate 
conceptual framework of morality, “the ethical” became a matter of personal 
preference as objective criteria of reasoning became the exclusive prerogative of 
the scientific mode of reasoning.      
 
An extremely important point that should be mentioned in the evolutionary 
progress of science is the radical repositioning of man’s place in the universe.  
The difference between the concept of a human being’s place in the world during 
the ancient epoch and Newton’s time was that, formerly the earth was 
considered the central point of the universe, and so every purpose was linked to 
humankind and his or her relationship with the world.  From this perspective, a 
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scientific account of man’s status in the universe was simply inconceivable.  This 
perception of man and the earth as the privileged centre of life was, however, 
seriously challenged by modern science with huge implications for humankind’s 
self-understanding within the context of modernity.  The metaphysically based 
argument for a teleological function of humans, a view popularized by Aristotle, 
simply had no room in modern man’s scientifically and biologically ordered 
universe. 
 
There were outstanding achievements in the area of mathematics that facilitated 
scientific research as well, such as, the discovery of calculus that was attributed 
independently to both Newton and Leibniz.  Besides this, an integral element of 
the formulation of scientific procedures was the added utilization of a logical 
system that included the appropriate management of language as a tool to 
promote exploration and analysis.   While former techniques were restructured 
and improved, newer ones were created for the purpose of gaining more efficient 
and better results.  This epoch was also remarkable for perfecting and 
developing essential instruments, for example, the microscope, telescope, 
thermometer.  The result of these inventions facilitated scientific observation and 
experimentation as greater precision and accuracy made it possible to extend the 
frontiers of knowledge.  It is relevant to keep in mind that while the goal of 
theoretical science was an attempt to understand the cosmos, however, it was 
due to the utilization of science in its practical realm that the greatest success 
was seen.   Technological inventions had come into their own.   
  
2.2 The Scientific Revolution: The impact of Sir Isaac Newton  
Significant thinkers who advanced the progress and achievements of science 
were Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes (accredited with being the 
father of modernity).  However, it is Newton, who is the primary exponent of 
modern scientific thinking as his work represents the ground-breaking 
transformations that occurred during modernity seeing that he revolutionized 
thinking on all levels, that is, not merely by his reformulation of former theories, 
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but by his own remarkable scientific innovations as shown in his various theories: 
the law of universal gravitation, rejection of the notion of absolute space and 
time, the contributions of kinetic energy to mechanics including mathematical 
advances.  Science thus became the legitimate discipline of truth and knowledge 
as its methods made progress towards eliminating uncertainty, and “objectivity” 
became the ‘exclusive province of scientific or instrumental conceptions of 
reason’. (John W. Tate 1997: 297)    The following quote substantiates this view: 
 
Thus modernity is characterized by an increasing ‘disenchantment’ 
– an undermining of the authoritative status of all value claims – 
because all ‘matters of evaluation’ are ‘scientifically demonstrable’. 
(John W. Tate 1997: 297) 
 
Throughout previous historical eras philosophy and science were integrated and 
as a result science did not focus on a single fixed method.  Modernity can be 
perceived as commencing from the time when philosophy and science became 
two distinct disciplines.  Once science became an autonomous discipline 
revolutionary transformations occurred that had an effect not only on knowledge 
concerning the perception of reality and the material world, but also on the 
understanding of the human being, as an autonomous moral subject.    
  
Science, augmented by the introduction of an unambiguous methodological 
structure, provided a point of departure for the attainment of knowledge as well 
as facilitated mankind’s realization for a better manner of survival through the 
awakening of a new consciousness based on a technical mode of reasoning.  
The objectives of this new consciousness were twofold:  Firstly, underlying 
scientific procedures was the search and discovery of universal and necessary 
truths since every generalization presupposes, to a certain degree, a belief in 
unity and consistency.  For this reason science is dependent upon principles and 
facts that are verifiable.  Systematized empirical science embodies the most 
remarkable findings of human research.  Secondly, to liberate society from 
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previously disabling factors, such as, dogmatic authority, superstitious beliefs 
and attitudes, and as a consequence gain control and understanding of the 
“objects of nature”.  This period became an ethos for a mechanistic 
understanding of “man” and nature, thus making it extremely difficult to provide a 
rational account for the moral foundations of modernity. 
 
2.2.1 Newton (1642-1727)      
It is definitely Newton who epitomizes the momentous transformations that 
occurred during modernity as he revolutionized not merely science, but society’s 
interrelations as he paved the way for much of the worldview at that time and 
subsequent years.  His methods frequently demonstrate certain anticipatory traits 
of what could probably follow, ‘nature was believed to contain a harmony and 
order which lent support to man’s efforts to penetrate its secrets’. (Grimsley 
1979: 11)  The significance of Newton’s mechanistic approach was its 
tremendous repercussion on all areas of knowledge and therefore existence.  His 
impact on the Enlightenment Project is well documented in Peter Gay’s work, 
The Enlightenment An Interpretation: The Science of Freedom and what has 
come to be known as the “Scientific Revolution”. (Gay 1970: 128)   As an 
esteemed scientist Newton’s research became the model upon which modern 
science was to develop its future research for many years to come.   
Furthermore, Newton emphasized the fact that since the universe is a 
systematized structure it could be rationally understood.  Here reason was also 
considered the sole factor in the acquisition of knowledge.      
 
It is interesting to note that although he looked for universal qualities, he still 
made provision for any modifications that might be required in his experiments.  
Peter Caws explained that this proviso was set out in his fourth rule that, 
‘notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, ti ll such time as 
other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate or 
liable to exceptions’, the original hypothesis could be defended on rational 
grounds. (Caws 1967: 341-342)  In other words, he was also willing to 
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discontinue or make improvements or amendments to any former hypothesis that 
might be contradictory to or that was not all-embracing within a strict scientific 
model. 
 
On the subject of science, it was claimed that the natural world could now be 
controlled seeing that events were now predictable.  But, on a social level the 
outcome was often controversial.   How does one account for the “subjective” 
basis of moral claims?  Firstly, the replacement of the power of the Church by the 
power of science fostered conditions that in all probability were key issues in the 
collapse of moral practices.  Secondly, it was maintained that since the scientific 
approach supported a logical method that included following rules and an exact 
structure, and in so doing generated conclusive and dependable results, the 
same procedure should be utilized to ground morality.  Based on this assumption 
it was reasoned that ethical standards could also be derived in a similar manner.  
This stance subsequently resulted in the exchange of ethical principles for a rule-
orientated society.  For instance, rules that regulated conduct, rules on how to 
proceed if a certain outcome was to be arrived at, not only in relation to scientific 
knowledge but also in connection with human interactions.  From this 
perspective, ethical thinking could be reduced to the value and utility of the 
consequences of human actions and decisions.  Thus we read in the writings of 
consequentialist thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, for example, that the 
‘rightness or wrongness of an action depends solely on the value of its 
consequences’. (Warnock, 1962: 257)  The consequentalist approach to morality 
implies that rationality in the context of modernity is ultimately reducible to a 
narrow range of possible consequences, which are at best predictable.  This 
mode of thinking also implies that people can be manipulated once we 
understand where they fit into the “big machine” which is the universe.  With the 
reduction of humans to the level of an instrumentalized mode of reasoning, 
humankind and nature now become the objects of control and manipulation in 
the pursuit of knowledge.   
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With reference to Newton’s ideas on the subject of God and man, it might be 
stated that he recognized the Christian God as the creator and ruler of the 
universe, but he also maintained that man’s existence is determined by the laws 
of nature.  There is therefore no place for religious dogma or tradition in Newton’s 
thinking.     
 
In Newton’s time physics was the primary science but as the focus of science 
became wider, and additional branches of science gradually evolved, for 
instance, chemistry, biology and the social sciences, it was observed that various 
other requirements came to light and required atypical or specific approaches.  
Dissimilarities between the needs of Newton’s era, in comparison with recent 
times, came about as a result of the scope and variety of information found in all 
areas of knowledge.  Nowadays it is not simply sufficient to construct a single 
theory upon which to verify an experiment since the interplay of diverse 
conditions and practical activities also require attention.  In addition it is 
recognized that probably different solutions might often be necessary or 
applicable to one particular problem.  Regardless of the radical notions that 
unsurprisingly either changed or in certain instances distorted the interaction of 
people with each other, as well as their natural world, there cannot be any 
hesitation in the acknowledgement that the modern world is indebted to Newton, 
especially within the disciplines of science and mathematics, which in turn have 
had far-reaching consequences for technological advances; the ultimate 
expression of the “superiority” of modern reason.   
 
In the next section, I will proceed to explore the philosophical implications of the 
alleged superiority of a model of rationality that is inextricably connected with the 
achievements of science and technology.  How should the philosopher of 
modernity, as the defender of reason, respond to the “success” of science? 
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Section Two 
 
 
2.3 Modernity:  As a philosophical category    
The distinctive rationalistic trend of the modern philosophical tradition is basically 
a reaction to the overwhelming success of the Scientific Revolution.  Philosophy 
could no longer remain fixated on the philosophical categories of thought of pre-
modern societies.  In this regard, Jürgen Habermas (1987: 7) correctly points out, 
‘Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its 
orientation from models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity 
out of itself.  Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility of 
escape’. (Habermas 1987: 7)(Emphasis, Habermas’s) 
 
It is against this conceptualization of modernity as a philosophical category that I 
now proceed to discuss the philosophies of René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, 
both of whom may arguably be considered to be the most important contributors 
to the development of a philosophical conceptual framework capable of 
accommodating the rationalistic ethos of the modern scientific tradition.  In this 
regard, their common commitment to reason as the only legitimatize source of 
knowledge has resulted in the development of a philosophical model aimed at 
providing a rational justification and validation of scientific knowledge.  Such a 
philosophical model would provide the a priori foundation of all knowledge 
claims, scientific as well as moral.  In this regard, the question concerning the 
possibility of knowledge provides the impetus for the development of a new 
epistemological approach from the perspective of modernity in which science 
operates as the destroyer of all traditional forms of knowledge.  The primary 
objective of both René Descartes and Immanuel Kant is therefore to establish a 
new philosophical model that is independent of traditional values and the 
traditional forms of epistemic justification of knowledge.  At the root of their 
shared objective is a fundamental assumption that the production of knowledge 
is a cumulative process, that is, knowledge develops towards its own perfection.  
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The task of the epistemologist is to ensure that he constructs the normative basis 
of such progress in conjunction with the methods and principles of modern 
scientific and mathematical reasoning.  From this perspective, Descartes’s and 
Kant’s approach proceed to establish foundations of certainty and truth for the 
modern forms of knowledge.  Of particular significance in their joint philosophical 
enterprise is the central and centralizing role that is given to “the subject” (“the 
mind” or “consciousness”), as the defining feature of the philosophical tradition of 
modernity, and which as the rational foundation of modern philosophical tradition, 
must now provide the normative basis of the “universal” categories of rationality 
as the condition of the possibility of knowledge.  
 
2.3.1 René Descartes: The search for absolute certainty 
Descartes (1596-1650) is regarded as the founder of modern philosophy.  His 
project of methodological (or radical) doubt in the search for the phi losophical 
foundations of certainty has had far reaching implications for the general 
understanding of modernity as a whole.  For progress to take place one must be 
absolutely certain that one’s knowledge claims are valid.  Descartes’s 
epistemological project reflects a fundamental assumption: true knowledge can 
only be established once the “eternal” laws of reason have been clarified. 
 
Descartes’s epistemological project is discussed in detail in a skillful step-by-step 
introspective manner in his treatise, A Discourse on Method: Meditations and 
Principles.   It is written with such simplicity and depth that one almost misses 
what Richard J. Bernstein calls a “spiritual journey”. (Bernstein 1983: 109)  In one 
sense this work is autobiographical as Descartes proceeds to explain how he 
personally reaches the state of certainty regarding his own existence.   
 
It was natural for Descartes, not only as a philosopher, but also particularly as a 
scientist and mathematician, to aspire to succeed in the attainment of a firm 
foundation of knowledge in science, metaphysics and religion.  For this purpose 
he maintained that it is necessary to develop a methodology that will ensure that 
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all knowledge claims be founded on indisputable principles.  Descartes is of the 
view that if philosophical scepticism can be defeated, then all knowledge can 
develop from a secure foundation of certainty. 
 
In order to achieve his goal, Descartes seeks to develop a systematic method on 
which to base all epistemological inquiries with a view to providing the solid 
ground to ascertain, for example, the truth or falsity of scientific theories.  Since 
he was a mathematician of the highest caliber and, therefore, familiar with the 
meticulousness of mathematical calculations and its reliability, he believed that a 
method that adheres to the fundamental principles of that discipline will also 
enable the philosopher to achieve the same results in the field of philosophy.  
 
A further advantage of a mathematical model, according to Descartes, is that 
because observation is not a requirement; the researcher does not need to 
concern himself or herself with reality “out there”, given the fact that our senses 
sometimes deceive us.  From this perspective, Descartes accordingly argued for 
the epistemological independence of the thinking subject, with the mathematical 
model of reasoning providing the guidance for the formulation of the “universal” 
foundation of knowledge.  Universal truth will therefore find expression in 
universal propositions whose self-evidence will be demonstrated in and through 
the process of deductive reasoning.     
 
In his Meditations, Descartes proceeds to investigate the possibility of absolute 
certainty by focussing on the possibility of doubt with regard to the methods of 
justification that characterize conventional thinking.  In this regard, he ends up 
doubting just about everything, except his own doubting consciousness.  He 
argues that since he is conscious that he thinks and doubts, he must 
undoubtedly naturally exist in order to perform the function of thinking and 
doubting.  From this argument Descartes concludes, ‘I think, therefore I am’. 
(Descartes 1965: xvii)(Emphasis, Descartes’s)  For Descartes, the thinking 
subject that doubts is capable of doubting that “he” thinks, and this provides him 
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with the philosophical foundation of certainty and truth.  The epistemological 
subject is placed at the centre of philosophical thinking and modernity thus 
coincides with the philosophical defense of reason which now becomes a 
defense of subjective (universal) conditions of certainty originating from “within” 
the “mind” of that rational creature called “man” who now occupies a universal 
(central) position in the circle of knowledge and truth.  Descartes accordingly 
states that ‘… the affirmation of the truth that the discoveries of reason are not 
made by deducing the particular from the universal, but from perceiving the 
universal in the individual instance’. (Descartes 1965: xiv)    
  
As stated above, Descartes chooses the method of radical doubt to establish the 
philosophical foundation of certainty.  He believes that anything and everything 
that can be doubted must be doubted; this is what he meant by the system of 
methodological or radical doubt.  Descartes doubts the existence of the external 
world and the reliability of the senses that reveal the world to him.  When trapped 
within the inner world of his own mind, however, Descartes has recourse to the 
“God” of the Christian faith to restore the link between the mind and the external 
world “out there”.  For Descartes, the “God” of the Christian world, who created 
the universe, has also created the ideas of humans regarding that universe.  
Descartes accordingly argues that he gets the idea of an external reality from 
God, who is no deceiver, and because all things are dependent on him ‘… there 
can be no doubt that God possesses the power of producing all the objects I am 
able distinctly to conceive’. (Descartes 1965: 127)  Moreover, Descartes employs 
this premise to reaffirm the truth-value of all scientific theories, as he is of the 
view that they rest on the attainment of truth and certainty concerning knowledge 
derived from notions based on logical reason and this logical reason is privileged 
insofar as it is guided by God-given ideas.  It therefore rules by divine right. 
 
Descartes’s argument for the independence of the mind (of the rational subject) 
from the external world inevitably leads him to defend a dualistic theory of reality, 
of an independent subject standing over and above an object.  Although the mind 
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is distinct from the body and better known, Descartes recognizes that he cannot 
exist without the body.  One is reliant on the body and senses for interaction with 
the world and others, and in general with all material objects.   He claims that the 
body is divisible, extended and a non-thinking substance.   However, despite the 
fact that the mind and body are separate and made up of unlike substances, they 
are closely linked and form a “unity”.  The view of extension poses a problem,  
which Descartes resolves by the aspect of motion that, according to him, 
explains how empty space becomes occupied.  Also it cannot be argued that we 
have no body for otherwise the experience of pain or hunger would not be felt.  
The brain transmits these sensations, as the mind is made conscious of what is 
taking place.  
 
According to Descartes, the mind is pure substance whose essence is thinking 
and is considered immortal and unvarying, whereas changes of the body do 
occur.  The essential characteristic of the mind is that it is not dependent on any 
material thing, including the body.  It is indivisible, not extended, and therefore 
does not require any space, and in known more clearly than the body.  In the 
discussion of the qualities of the mind Descartes refers to the soul and its 
attributes, namely, thoughts and perception.  Besides this reference to the traits 
of the soul, Descartes also claims that there are crucial differences between the 
nature of thoughts and perception.  For Descartes, a thinking entity is connected 
to the mind, whilst perception also depends on a body to fulfill its entire function.    
 
It is important to recognize the paradox at the root of the Cartesian foundational 
project of philosophical certainty.  For a philosophy such as Descartes, 
committed to a rational justification of modernity which frowns upon all non-
modern forms of knowledge, it is interesting to note that a traditional belief in the 
“God” of Christianity ultimately provides the breakthrough into the realm of 
philosophical certainty.  Modern reason needs its traditional faith in “God” to 
reassure it that its knowledge claims are true and therefore of universal 
significance.  As Descartes reflects on whether he exists or not, he holds the 
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notion that since he doubts and is deceived at times, therefore there must be 
some “divine” revelation that can take him beyond the perils of self-doubt.  He 
asserts quite confidently that this idea must come from a being that is more 
perfect than himself, and this idea leads him to conclude that for the idea of God 
to exist in his mind, there must be a God who has put this idea in his mind.  How 
else can we explain the origin of the idea of God?  From this perspective, the 
philosopher of modernity becomes the representative and custodian of God’s 
ideas of truth and knowledge on account of reason’s ability to “hook up” with a 
“God” beyond modernity.  
 
In the next section, I will examine the philosophical efforts of Kant to ground his 
defense of modernity within certain (universal) categories of thought, once again 
reaffirming modernity’s commitment to the centrality of the modern subject whose 
autonomy from other non-forms of thought is the guarantee of the self-assurance 
and success of the project of modernity.   
 
2.3.2      Immanuel Kant:  The maturity of reason 
Kant (1724-1804) was one of the foremost academics of his day and part of the 
social order of the “Enlightenment” years.  Not only did he uphold the 
fundamental doctrines of Enlightenment thinking, but he also developed its 
doctrines to greater heights, specifically the idea that the acquisition of all 
knowledge is possible through the faculty of reasoning by a process of a priori 
reasoning, that is, independently of sense experience.  Even though Kant 
acknowledges, the interdependence of the intellect (the subject) and sense 
experience (the object), there can be no doubt of the central importance that he 
attaches to the “subjective dimension” in the context of modern philosophical 
thinking.  In Kant’s (1983: 84) own words: 
 
If our subjective constitution be removed, the represented object, 
with the qualities which sensible intuition bestows upon it, is 
nowhere to be found, and cannot possibly be found.  For it is this 
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subjective constitution which determines its form and appearance. 
(Kant, 1983: B 62)  
 
In the context of modernity, the subject, by turning “inwards”, thus becomes the 
self-conscious source of enlightenment, and this “subjective turn” becomes the 
cornerstone of modern philosophy.  For Kant, the privileging of the subject has a 
philosophical significance comparable to a “Copernican revolution” insofar as it 
presupposes a radical break from all traditional models of human self-
understanding.  In the language of Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962), Kant believes that he is introducing a “paradigm shift”, the 
nature of which will forever change our understanding of ourselves as rational 
agents in a world governed by the laws of reason.  As Kant (1983: 22) himself 
puts it: 
 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform 
to objects.  But all our attempts to extend our knowledge of objects 
by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of 
concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure.  We must 
therefore make trial whether we may not have more success … if 
we suppose that the objects must conform to our knowledge.  This 
would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be 
possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining 
something in regard to them prior to their being given.  We should 
then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary 
hypothesis. (Kant, 1983: B xvi)(Emphasis, Kant’s)  
 
Given the centrality and privileging of the subject in his philosophy, Kant now 
proceeds to describe the nature and possibilities of an enlightened subject within 
the context of modernity.  In this regard the concept of philosophical maturity as 
opposed to immaturity plays a significant part in his thinking.  Kant is of the 
opinion that maturity is synonymous with moral responsibility and intellectual 
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autonomy or freedom.  Freedom (or autonomy), however, presupposes moral 
responsibility because the rational agency of modern man is subject to a “moral 
law” that is universally applicable to all rational beings.  According to Kant, the 
exercise of reason is a moral responsibility which requires intellectual maturity.  
This line of reasoning is spelt out in his famous essay, What is Enlightenment?, 
in which we read, ‘Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. 
… “Have courage to use your own reason!” – that is the motto of enlightenment’. 
(Kant 1981: 85)       
 
This Kantian view of intellectual maturity is reiterated by James Schmidt when he 
states, ‘Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity .  
Immaturity is the inability to make use of one’s own understanding without the 
guidance of another’. (Schmidt 1996: 58)(Emphasis, Schmidt’s)  By establishing 
the principle of subjectivity (in the form of self-determination) as the fundamental 
principle of modernity, Kant challenges the modern subject to free himself from 
the irrational burden of tradition.  
 
Kant contends that being moral actually implies being in harmony with the idea of 
freedom.  He sets out to show that the idea of morality admits of the possibility of 
universality.   From this perspective, the “moral law” is applicable to all rational 
beings and as such, it requires that the individual (as a moral subject) ought to be 
understood “as an end withal, never as means only”. (Stumpf (1975): 
320)(Emphasis, Stumpf’s)  In this regard, Kant postulates a form of “practical 
thinking” as being the appropriate source of moral reasoning and moral actions.  
By opposing the realm of practical reason (that is, moral-political thinking) to that 
of “pure” theoretical reason (that is, scientific or instrumental thinking), Kant 
seeks to maintain a fundamental distinction between two fundamental sources of 
reasoning.  The freedom of the modern subject must therefore be defended on 
practical grounds.  It is when this fundamental distinction is collapsed in favor of 
scientific rationality that the modern subject fails to acknowledge any other form 
of progress and enlightenment save that which originates in the realm of 
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scientific-technical thinking.  This point is also reiterated by Jürgen Habermas 
when he writes: 
  
The real difficulty in the relation of theory and praxis does not arise 
from this new function of science as a technological force, but 
rather from the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish 
between practical and technical power.  Yet even a civilization that 
has been rendered scientific is not granted dispensation from 
practical questions. … For then no attempt is made to attain a 
rational consensus on the part of citizens concerning the practical 
control of their destiny.  Its place is taken by the attempt to attain 
technical control over history by perfecting the administration of 
society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical. (In 
Bernstein 1983: 43)(Emphasis, Bernstein’s) 
 
Kant holds the view that only moral conduct prompted by pure practical reason 
ensures the freedom of the subject.  While pure reason enables one to 
understand the natural world by reflecting on the a priori transcendental 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge, it is the faculty of practical reason that 
provides the a priori rational grounds for understanding free will as the basis of 
our moral responsibility to acknowledge our duty to respect the “moral law”.  As 
Kant (1956: 84-85) puts it: 
 
The moral law is, in fact, for the will of a perfect being a law of 
holiness.  For the will of any other finite rational being, however, it is 
a law of duty, of moral constraint, and of determination of his 
actions through respect for the law and reverence for its duty. … 
We stand under a discipline of reason, and in all our maxims we 
must not forget our subjection to it.   … Duty and obligation are the 
only names that we must give to our relation to the moral law. 
(Kant, 1956: 84-85) 
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Moreover, Kant claims that for a rational (free) will to be accepted as the 
foundation of the moral law, it must be made universally acceptable to other 
rational beings in the form of maxims that admit of the possibility of universal 
application.  From this perspective, our principles of morality can escape the 
possibility of self -indulgent subjectivism and emotivism, and thus for “all rational 
agents”, the law becomes permissible.   
 
Kant’s view on morality has, of course, been challenged by many thinkers.  In 
this regard, Robert Pippin (1991: 59) summarizes the respective critiques of 
Johann von Schiller (1759-1805) and Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) as follows: 
  
[O]nly an action motivated by pure practical reason, or done for the 
sake of the morally right, could be considered a truly free and 
morally worthy action.  … [they] wanted to know how Kant could 
distinguish between simply recognizing the principle under which “a 
purely rational agent” would act, and being motivated oneself to act 
that way.  … the issue was how one could be said, … to determine 
oneself to make the moral law a motive for action. (Pippin 1991: 59)  
 
It is relevant to mention here that for Kant, the possibility of morality rests on the 
possibility of the ‘Is’ (of pure reason) and the ‘Ought’ (of practical reason).   
However, MacIntyre’s point of view that the moral law is conditional upon 
objectivity is questionable.  Kant’s argument that the possibility of morality as an 
objective and universal law based on practical reason does, however, represent 
an attempt to overcome the threat of instrumental rationality (that is a subject-
object model of rationality), as the only appropriate form of rationality within the 
paradigm of modernity.  Thus, although Kant is aware of the kind of certainty that 
informs the mathematical and scientific forms of reasoning, he does not fall into 
the trap of absolutising, and therefore privileging, the scientific mode of 
rationality.  For Kant the realm of morality, falls outside the realm of object-
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centred (objectivistic) thinking, and from this perspective, he defends human 
freedom as having its origins in a realm “beyond” that of physical reality.  Morality 
and freedom are therefore necessarily “meta”-physical.  For Kant, metaphysical 
dilemmas can only arise when we confuse a scientific model of rationality with a 
moral (practical) model of rationality, and as long as conceptual confusion 
persists, science (and the instrumental mode of rationality) will continue to 
dominate within the paradigm o f modernity.   
 
Kant’s moral position, insofar as it attempts to provide objective certainty to moral 
actions, has also opened him up to the charge of dogmatism.  Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte (1762-1814), for example, has argued that ‘even the Kantian appeal to 
reason or to philosophy might be viewed as dogmatic or ungrounded unless we 
can show how such a commitment could be viewed as the “product” of a 
subject’s purely self-determining, or absolutely free activity’. (Pippin 1991: 58)    
 
Kant has also been accused of circular reasoning insofar as he deploys reason 
to defend reason as the only legitimate basis of human freedom.  Kant, however, 
defends himself by claiming that reason has its own framework and principles of 
judgment, and as such, it reveals the universal and necessary principles of 
rationality.  He argues that, pure concepts originate exclusively in the mind and 
not in the external life world.  Karl Jaspers explains the Kantian position as 
follows: 
 
The pure concepts of the understanding must, to be sure, have 
their source in the nature of the mind, but this does not mean that 
they are brought about by the object or that they produce the 
object. (Jasper 1957: 243)      
 
Kant’s defense of the autonomy and independence of the epistemological and 
moral subject thus provides us with the relevant framework for understanding 
modernity as a philosophical category.  In spite of the differences in approach 
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between him and Descartes, there can be no doubting the importance that they 
both attach to the paradigm of subjectivity as the condition of the possibility of the 
modern philosophical tradition.  It is therefore on the basis of the Cartesian-
Kantian legacy that we will seek to engage with MacIntyre as a critic of 
modernity. 
 
2.3.3 The Cartesian-Kantian legacy 
Underlying Descartes’s philosophy is the necessity to arrive at absolute certainty 
that would verify and give a rational explanation of all knowledge.  To this end he 
endeavoured to develop a methodology that would establish the indisputable 
foundation of certainty as the condition of the possibility of “true” knowledge.  His 
argument was that if all uncertainty could be eliminated then modernity would be 
able to transcend the prejudice and superstition of traditional knowledge.  
 
Kant, on the other hand, although he was not completely in agreement with 
Descartes’s approach, namely, the view that in order to arrive at true knowledge 
after the application of a method of radical doubt with a view to revealing the 
(thinking) subject (in all his “splendid isolation”) as the rational basis of 
philosophical certainty, he nevertheless shares Descartes’s assumption 
regarding the universal subject as holding the key to the question of rationality 
and truth.  The focal point of Kant primarily is the a priori  assumptions (the 
“categories of understanding”) that necessarily and unavoidably accompany the 
process of rational thinking.  Whereas Descartes’s method was fundamentally 
based on a foundational model and the mode of reaching undoubted knowledge 
through scepticism, Kant’s mode of arriving at knowledge, on the other hand, 
was based on a “transcendental mode of reflection” that claimed to provide the 
foundation of the possibility of knowledge.   
 
It is important to bear in mind the ethos of the Enlightenment period and 
relevance of the utilization of reason as a means to succeed in understanding the 
nature of knowledge and the rationale of its justification as opposed to the so-
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called irrational and unsound issues that come about because of superstitious 
beliefs and dogmatic perspectives of the pre-modern world.   For Kant one of the 
central doctrines of modernity was related to his ideals about what enlightenment 
actually meant, particularly his notions regarding the autonomy of the individual, 
which implies total independence as stated in the maxim of the Enlightenment 
Project, ‘Sapere Aude!  “Have courage to use your own reason!” – ’. (Kant 1981:  
85)(Emphasis, Kant’s)   
 
It is well-known that Newton’s scientific methodology influenced Kant’s 
epistemological approach as it emphasized the universal condition of scientific 
knowledge.  From this perspective, Kant was of the view that in spite of the 
tremendous success of the scientific methodology of Newtonian physics, it still 
needed the guiding principles of metaphysical thinking to provide the answer to a 
metaphysical need for coherence and unity.  It is from this perspective that we 
must appreciate Kant’s integrity when he writes, ‘ I have therefore found it 
necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith’. (Kant, 1965: B 
xxx)    From Kant’s point of view, therefore, scientific knowledge is blind unless 
enlightened by a model of rationality that illustrates its very possibility.  
Philosophical modernity, with all its faith in reason, must therefore go beyond the 
achievements of modern science in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
science, and thus of modernity as a historical and cultural manifestation of 
human progress.  In order to accomplish this, however, it must defend its “faith” 
in reason on rational grounds that take us into the realm of metaphysical thinking.  
The Cartesian-Kantian legacy is therefore, in the final analysis, an act of faith.   
 
2.4 Conclusion    
While it is acknowledged that Newton undoubtedly contributed extensively to 
scientific thinking, which lay at the root of the new consciousness of time, and in 
the process altered humankind’s way of viewing the world, one still needs to be 
aware that both negative and positive consequences came about as a result of 
this new consciousness.  It should be noted, while the modern world has indeed 
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made unbelievable strides in the domain of science and technology, it cannot be 
stated with any degree of conviction that all is well with modernity, especially with 
regard to the metaphysical-moral-political questions of freedom from human 
domination, oppression, exploitation, and other forms of human cruelty.  It is 
necessary to mention that in recent times, scientists and other thinkers have 
become aware that just following Descartes’s or Kant’s universalistic approach to 
morality is problematic and inadequate to deal with an understanding of “man” as 
a creature of history, whose sense of right and wrong can only be understood 
from the perspective of the contingency of criteria whose validity is confined to  
specific cultural traditions.  It is from this perspective that we will proceed to 
discuss MacIntyre’s engagement with modernity in the chapter that follows. 
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Chapter Three 
Modernity: A project doomed to failure  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter I showed that the project of modernity has been mainly 
understood in terms of an ideal of  “philosophical enlightenment “, with specific 
reference to a scientific model of rationality as the barometer of progress.  In this 
regard, I examined the respective efforts of Descartes and Kant to provide a 
(universal) normative framework for grounding the achievements of modern 
science by implicitly seeking to defend a basic assumption of a “universal 
subject” as the normative grounds for evaluating, and validating the knowledge 
claims of science.  From this perspective, the central challenge of the modern 
philosopher is of a metaphysical and moral nature, since the modern philosopher 
has to provide the “spiritual” universal foundation of truth in a world that is clearly 
sceptical of all “otherworldly” explanations and all forms of “superstitions”.  
According to MacIntyre, modernity’s claim to universality in the name of scientific 
progress is a direct denial of “man” as a historical and social being, since the a 
priori grounds for validating such claims to universality are a direct denial of the 
historical-cultural dimensions of human existence.  It is the denial that man is a 
historical-moral-political being, in the name of an abstract universal, that provides 
the major impetus for MacIntyre’s critical engagement with the defenders of 
modernity.   
 
In this chapter, I intend to explore the nature and implications of MacIntyre’s 
critique of modernity.  This will serve the purpose of providing the relevant 
context for assessing MacIntyre’s view that the Enlightenment Project is “doomed 
to failure”. (Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift 1992: 95)   MacIntyre’s critique of 
modernity will in turn provide the relevant context for a critical evaluation of 
emotivism and utilitarianism which, although they represent the dominant ethical 
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positions of modernity, must in MacIntyre’s view, be seen as a major symptom of 
the pathological moral decline of modern “man”. 
 
My discussion of MacIntyre’s critique of modernity will focus on of the following 
considerations: 
 
· MacIntyre’s interpretation and critique of modernity (3.2) 
· Plato’s allegory of the cave (as a philosophical frame of reference 
for understanding MacIntyre’s characterization of modernity (3.2.1) 
· Modernity: A culture in disarray (3.3) 
· Emotivism in perspective (3.3.1) 
· Utilitarianism in perspective (3.3.2)  
  
3.2 MacIntyre’s interpretation and critique of modernity    
MacIntyre’s critical appraisal of modernity is based on his interpretation of the 
model of rationality associated with the modern scientific ideal of progress.  In 
this regard, MacIntyre is especially disturbed by the moral and spiritual 
implications for the individual who must now reorient himself or herself in a 
society that has yielded completely to the authority of modern science.  For 
MacIntyre, the uncritical acceptance of the scientific model of cognition as the 
one and only foundation of truth and progress in the reconstruction of modern 
society will invariably result in the moral-spiritual impoverishment of modern man 
insofar as modernity has abandoned its historical-cultural heritage in its pursuit of 
an unknown future.  Modernity’s abandonment of its moral-spiritual legacy is for 
MacIntyre the abandonment of ‘man-as-he-could -be-if-he-realized-his-telos’. 
(MacIntyre 1985: 54) 
  
MacIntyre argues therefore that the project of modernity has failed.  He believes 
that it was doomed to failure from the moment of inception because of modern 
man’s loss of historical consciousness, which is the bearer of his or her moral-
spiritual legacy which modernity seeks to replace with the promise of progress in 
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the spirit of scientific-rational enlightenment.  However, given the fragmentary 
nature of scientific knowledge, MacIntyre doubts whether modern man can 
restore a sense of moral consciousness that is capable of doing justice to our 
innermost yearning for spiritual meaning, coherence and stability, the lack of 
which only serves to reinforce the spiritual disorder that has accompanied the 
rise of modernity.  As MacIntyre (1985) maintains, the modern person’s 
disengagement from his or her traditional roots leads to social isolation and 
intellectual division and hence a deep void in not being able to reach out and 
understand “the other”.  MacIntyre is of the view that this fragmentation and 
disconnectedness that has accompanied the rise of modernity must 
understandably also have provided fertile soil for the growth of the liberal tradition 
of individualism that is so characteristic of the modern age.  In the absence of a 
collectively shared telos, that is, a commonly shared moral-spiritual frame of 
reference, the modern individual must now function in accordance with a 
narrowly defined set of “rules” which will serve as the “rational” basis for the 
pursuit of his or her private ends.  In the field of morality, the individual is 
condemned to function “on his own”; as a private agent in pursuit of private ends 
which will hopefully bring him or her “happiness”.  Modernity’s rejection of 
traditional values that one shares with others as the condition of one’s 
understanding of oneself as a “social-political animal” thus gives way to the 
introduction of the individual as a private agent for whom rationality is interpreted 
as the instrumental-technical means of achieving a particular (private) end(s).   
 
For MacIntyre, the major challenge for modern man is the creation of a 
meaningful symbolic order that is capable of responding to the rational 
foundations of modernity.  There is indeed a profound contradiction eroding the 
ethos of modernity: on the one hand, it defines itself on the basis of a universal 
claim to reason (albeit scientific reason), on the other hand, it is incapable of 
providing a rational justification for its claim to universality.  MacIntyre’s critique of 
modernity’s claim to universality does indeed have profound implications for his 
own position.  A modernity with a false claim to universality can only be a 
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modernity accountable to itself on its own terms: the paradox of modernity is 
engendered by its failure to recognize the relativity of its own position.  In this 
regard, Neil Levy (1999: 471) captures the radical implication of relativism that 
inspires MacIntyre’s critique of modernity when he (Levy) writes ‘because of its 
universalistic pretensions, modern culture is therefore profoundly relativistic’. 
(Levy 1999: 471)    
 
In After Virtue (MacIntyre 1985: 1-4), MacIntyre paints a “disquieting” scenario 
wherein he demonstrates the dilemma that characterizes the modern epoch.  In 
this regard, one is reminded of the “allegory of the cave”, as presented in Plato’s 
Republic, in which the condition of man is likened to being imprisoned in a dark 
cave, where the majority are condemned to a twilight world of illusion, but where 
the gifted few (philosophers) are endowed with the intellectual-spiritual potential 
of discovering “the Truth” outside the cave.   
 
3.2.1  Plato’s allegory of the cave 
Plato introduces his symbolic tale concerning the  transition from an 
unenlightened state to an enlightened state in a challenging way.  Plato asks us 
to imagine some men living in a cave.  They only see shadows on a wall caused 
by the glow of a fire.  They never see the actual objects and also believe that the 
sounds heard originate from these shadows.  Furthermore, they interpret their 
experience as being real as they are unfamiliar with anything else.  The 
uneducated are not unlike prisoners since they too are, metaphorically speaking, 
held in “chains”, that is, by their prejudices that hold them in bondage because of 
their fixed and limited views.   Plato inquires, what if these men were released 
and forced to confront what existed behind the “shadows” and not just accept the 
reflections they see as truth itself?  A normal reaction from prisoners would 
probably be to retreat as readjustment to another worldview is often fraught with 
challenges, some painful, others perhaps joyous.  The allegory of the cave 
presents a dual state of consciousness; someone stepping out of the “darkness” 
into an acceptance of the gift of “light”. 
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Uncertainty about aspects of true knowledge and appearance plays a significant 
role in understanding reality. Questions focussed on whether appearances 
represent truth become problematic since the “phantom-like” (Cornford 1973: 
199) shadows seem real to those imprisoned.  This is caused by the prisoners’ 
belief that the shadows represent genuine objects and accordingly the “whole 
truth”.  (Desmond Lee 1983: 318)  However, this view is shortsighted; as Stumpf 
points out, ‘A flower makes a shadow which gives very little, if any, indication of 
what a flower really looks like’. (Stumpf (1975): 53)   Plato’s allegory suggests 
that most people live in darkness that distorts their vision, and in order to emerge 
from this state of affairs, humans need to be transformed by the unchanging 
radiance of the sun that enables the light to come through.  An important 
implication of this view is to become enlightened through education.    
 
Education, then, is a matter of conversion, a complete turning 
around from the world of appearance to the world of reality. “The 
conversion of the soul,” says Plato, “is not to put the power of sight 
in the soul’s eye, which already has it, but to ensure that, instead of 
looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be.”  
But looking in the right direction does not come easily.  …  
Similarly, when those who have been liberated from the cave 
achieve the highest knowledge, they must not be allowed to remain 
in the higher world of contemplation, but must be made to come 
back down into the cave and take part in the life and labors of the 
prisoners. (Stumpf (1975): 55)(Emphasis, Stumpf’s) 
 
The above passage seems to sum up essential factors of the human condition as 
Plato sees it.  It also conveys his opinion concerning the necessity of serving our 
fellow-beings.  For instance, a former prisoner, although unwilling to return to the 
cave, is required to do so in order to be of some service to the community.  This 
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service is praiseworthy notwithstanding the resistance that he or she might 
encounter from those who are unenlightened (in captivity).   
 
However, despite the merits of knowledge, as such, Plato makes known that the 
"idea of the good” is the very foundation upon which truth and knowledge are 
structured and hence absolutely essential. (Bloom 1968: 517c)(Emphasis, 
Bloom’s)  Its enduring qualities are validated in the principles of moral conduct 
and consequences experienced.  But, besides that, Plato claims that becoming 
conscious of the ‘good is the culminating point of a man’s education and enables 
him to understand everything else’. (D. J. O’Connor 1964: 21)    
 
There appears to be similarities in considering what both Plato and MacIntyre are 
attempting to impart in their allegories, namely, that morality is an interrelated 
aspect of all true knowledge.  However, it is interesting to note that different 
points of view are held by both concerning controversies. MacIntyre claims that 
controversies result in endless disagreements; on the other hand, Plato 
understood that controversies are caused by ‘each one’s looking at a different 
aspect of the reality’. (Stumpf (1975): 55)  
 
In MacIntyre’s “allegory of modern man” however, there is no possibility of 
escaping from the shackles of modernity by believing that the universalistic 
pretensions of modern science can “deliver” on the promise of moral-spiritual 
enlightenment.  It is the failure to “deliver” that leads to modernity’s confusion as 
to what ought to be classified as right or wrong.  Modern society’s moral 
standards are either practically absent or in a state of complete disarray.  
Communities have lost their traditional goals and customary means of 
communication, and hence their direction and stability.  A normative moral code 
of conduct appears to be unintelligible, and therefore meaningless, to modern 
humankind.    
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J. E. Barnhart (1977: 43-44) is in agreement with MacIntyre’s claim that  ‘men 
first of all lost any over-all social agreement as to what is the right way to live 
together, and so ceased to be able to make sense of any [theological] claims to 
moral authority’.  MacIntyre emphasizes this standpoint in relation to what he 
describes as being symptomatic, as well as the cause, of the major disintegration 
of moral standards, thereby also bringing about man’s indifference to the 
question of the “meaning of life” in the context of modernity.  For MacIntyre, the 
transitions and modifications that have arisen as a consequence of modernity’s 
rejection of traditional patterns of thought concerning moral-spiritual issues, have 
introduced a moral-spiritual pathology as a result of the modern faith that human 
conduct can adequately be accounted for by the methods of modern science.  If 
nature can successfully be conceived of as a “machine” subject to the law of 
cause and effect, and thus render itself susceptible to the scientific predictions of 
man, then why should we seek for a different principle to understand and predict 
the nature of human conduct?  Modern humankind, without his or her spiritual 
dimension, is therefore reduced to a bundle of selfish desires whose satisfaction 
can be accounted for in purely psychological terms.  In short, the (private) ego, 
driven by selfish greed for the sake of the survival of the individual, becomes the 
basis of modernity’s self-understanding as moral-political beings.  This point of 
view is exemplified in the writings of modern contract theorists such as John 
Locke and David Hume as they ‘tried to give an account of personal identity 
solely in terms of psychological states or events’. (MacIntyre 1985: 217)  It is this 
state of affairs that MacIntyre has in mind when he presents us with his own 
(modern) version of Plato’s allegory of the cave.                                     
 
In his own version of the allegory of the cave, MacIntyre emphasizes the 
destruction that has come in the wake of modernity’s overemphasis on the 
authority and legitimacy of science as the foundation of rationality and 
enlightenment (wisdom).  He invites his reader to imagine a situation in which 
science, as an actively pursued process of knowledge, has all but disappeared.  
All we are left with are bits and pieces of knowledge, stored in our individual 
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memories.  All our books have been destroyed; our language has changed, and, 
as a result, there has been a radical transformation of conceptual schemes.  
Moreover, ideas concerning theoretical and practical issues are vague and, as a 
result, problematic.  The new cultural climate has prompted agents  to reinterpret 
things in entirely different ways in order to resolve the prevalent confusion. 
Wherever deemed necessary, unorthodox strategies are in order since the goal 
is that sense can and should be made of a rather difficult situation.  In view of the 
fact that difficulties are part of life, and therefore unavoidable, some people might 
casually conclude that everything is “fine” as it is, while others might not even be 
aware that something is critically wrong since they conclude that this is the way 
things are supposed to be.   
 
The situation described above does indeed admit of several plausible reactions.  
One may argue; for example, how can something be “fine” if one does not even 
know that something is lost or missing?  Another may argue that even though 
something is missing, knowledge begins with the self-realization concerning 
one’s own ignorance about that which is missing in much the way that Socrates 
made a virtue out of his own ignorance.  Modernity’s response, however, is to 
start anew; to build from the foundation “upwards”.  But how should modernity 
proceed to regain dependable guidelines when it refuses, in principle, to take into 
account the teachings of tradition?  From this perspective, D. Z. Phillips correctly 
poses the question, ‘If all we have are remnants of moral discourse which, 
divorced from their moral original contexts, lack sense, from what moral source 
can we be informed of our confusion?’ (Phillips 1984: 111)(Emphasis, Phillips’s) 
 
In contrast to the emphasis placed by modernity on science as a radical 
movement of progress, moral ideals seem to have lost their legitimacy and 
universal relevance.  The inability to judge and evaluate moral actions on the 
basis of universally acceptable principles does indeed point to a “moral crisis” (J. 
B. Schneewind 1983: 536) within modernity for MacIntyre.  Accordingly, 
MacIntyre declares that this dilemma has come about because modernity lacks 
 43 
the standards and the means to place moral thinking, on a rational and practical 
basis that is universally acceptable.  In After Virtue, MacIntyre is of the view that 
the modern individual is governed by preferences that sustain a culture that 
encourages moral disagreement.  Carl Wellman (1975: 214) also draws attention 
to this state of affairs when he remarks that moral ‘disagreements seem to be in 
sharp contrast to our almost universal agreement about the validity or invalidity of 
any proposed deductive argument'.  Be that as it may, MacIntyre is basically 
determined to establish an ethical system that resembles that of Aristotle as 
expounded in the latter’s Nichomachean Ethics, (MacIntyre 1985: 147), and 
based on the communalistic value system of the city-state of ancient Greece.  
MacIntyre is deeply impressed by the idea of a “cosmic order”, so central to the 
thought of thinkers such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.  The latter states, for 
example, that ‘there exists a cosmic order which dictates the place of each virtue 
in a total harmonious scheme of human life’. (In Richard J. Bernstein 1986: 134)   
 
MacIntyre’s refusal to collapse scientific and ethical thinking into one form of 
rationality is the animating impulse behind his critical analysis and investigation 
of modernity.  This refusal notwithstanding, MacIntyre wants to be able to apply 
the same standards of consistency and reliability associated with the scientific 
mode of reasoning to the realm of moral thinking.  In this regard, he is clearly 
indebted to Aristotle who was of the opinion that moral reasoning consists in a 
comprehensible and logical method that ‘provided a context in which evaluative 
claims functioned as a particular kind of factual claim’. (In Gary Kitchen 1997: 73)  
But is one justified in expecting the same results from ethics (that is, the same 
certainty) that one has come to associate with science?  Science is, after all, 
concerned with conceptualizing a basic objective reality “out there”, while ethics 
is concerned with our understanding of a more “subjective” dimension of values 
and emotions.  Moreover, unlike objective reality that may be assumed to have 
an ontological status that is somehow independent of the knowing subject, value 
systems can, and do indeed, differ from one cultural tradition to another.  And 
even if morality originates within the subjective realm of emotions, does this 
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mean that they are, in principle, beyond the scope of rational understanding?  
Can one, furthermore, just accept that because virtue differs from culture to 
culture, this is further proof of the subjective (irrational) nature of morality?  
MacIntyre argues that despite variations of the “lists” of vocabulary and 
disagreement or agreement about ethical values, at the heart of a moral system 
of every cultural group one can detect explicit qualities that exemplify or are 
typical of moral conduct, and thus MacIntyre asserts ‘the fact that virtue is an 
excellence is uncontroversial, and to that extent there is at least a minimal core 
concept of virtue’. (Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski 1996: 88)   
 
MacIntyre’s choice to rehabilitate the Aristotelian approach to ethics is motivated 
by the apparent success in reconciling standards of value with standards of 
scientific truth, in short, in spite of the clear distinction between theoretical 
(scientific) reasoning and moral (practical) reasoning, Aristotle succeeded in 
presenting a holistic account of the nature of rationality.  According to MacIntyre, 
modernity should also be able to offer us a holistic account of rationality, that is, 
one that takes into account the scientific as well as moral dimensions of 
rationality, without the one form of rationality being privileged at the expense of 
the other.  It is precisely in respect of modernity’s failure to provide such an 
account of rationality, given its privileging of the scientific mode of reasoning, that 
modernity as a “project fails”. (MacIntyre 1985: 66)  The wisdom of the ancients 
is thus rejected in favour of the more limited “wisdom” emanating from the 
modern form of instrumental rationality.   
 
It is crucial for MacIntyre that modernity finds a universal focal point for its 
understanding of morality while, at the same time, maintaining a clear distinction 
between value statements, on the one hand, and empirical statements, on the 
other hand.  Statements will accordingly be evaluated as being factually “true or 
false", and morally "right or wrong".  It should be noted, therefore, that although 
something may be factually true, it does not follow that we can make any moral 
judgments based upon that truth.  Thus, increased knowledge or progress in 
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technology does not in any way imply increased knowledge of ourselves as 
moral beings, but this does not imply that morality is at best of an arbitrary or 
conventional nature.  We have the capacity to choose beyond the “good and evil” 
prevalent in a particular society for the sake of a “higher” moral truth.  It is this 
form of reasoning that distinguishes MacIntyre’s position from the more 
“subjectivist” position of thinkers such as David Hume who, for example, states: 
 
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and 
affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and 
that because reason alone, as we have already prov’d, can never 
have any such influence.   Morals excite passions, and produce or 
prevent actions.  Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this 
particular.  The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of 
our reasons. (Hume 1969: 509) 
 
Unlike Hume, MacIntyre seeks to establish a rational basis for understanding 
morality, the nature of which has a direct bearing on the integrity and dignity of 
the individual.  This calls for the type of “moral education” that empowers the 
individual in his or her search for moral excellence or virtue in any given situation.  
Clearly, MacIntyre is calling for the moral (practical) education of modern man, 
the possibility of which must be sought beyond the strategic-technical rationality 
of modern technocratic Western society.  Bernstein’s distinction between the 
“technical” and “practical” mode of reasoning, illustrates this point:   
 
Techne, or a technique is learned and can be forgotten, we can 
“lose” a skill.  But ethical “reason” can neither be learned nor 
forgotten.  …  Man always finds himself in an “acting situation” and 
he is always obliged to use ethical knowledge and apply it 
according to the exigencies of his concrete situation. (Bernstein 
1983: 147) 
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On the subject of the objective methods utilized by science, MacIntyre is insistent 
and committed to what he claims is of paramount importance within the context 
of maintaining an equilibrium which, from the perspective of modernity, implies 
that support should be given to the practical nature of reasoning.  The role of 
rational and logical thinking should not be overlooked in the respective disciplines 
of science and ethics.  The major implication of this “broader” conception of 
rationality within modernity is that modernity should understand itself as a 
project-of-dialogue, rather than a project-of-science.  In this regard, the rules of 
science, just like the rules of morality, could be tested and retested (ad infinitum) 
in the light of new experiences, as modernity constantly seeks to recognize the 
relativity of its own progress.  Bernstein emphasizes this point when he argues 
that the nature of science is not just the acquisition of knowledge, but more 
appropriately, science should be directed towards the “practical character of such 
rationality”. (Bernstein 1983: 57)    
 
3.3 Modernity: A culture in disarray             
According to MacIntyre, modernity’s major weakness is its lack of historical 
consciousness, and its failure to recognize the communitarian nature of human 
existence.  One of the most fundamental aspects of modernity is its emphasis on 
individual autonomy that has led to a process of re-evaluation linked to identity 
and meaning, which in turn has progressed into the secularization of social 
practices as it ‘sought the demystification and desacralization of knowledge and 
social organization in order to liberate human beings from their chains’. (Harvey 
1989: 3)  The core of MacIntyre’s criticism is modernity’s downward trend of 
moral behaviour as it is ‘essentially a reflection of our cultural condition and lacks 
the resources to correct its disorders’. (MacIntyre 1979: 16)  This state of affairs 
has caused interminable controversies regarding reasons why, for example, wars 
in certain instances happen and are nevertheless justified as moral, from a 
particular perspective, but equally immoral from another perspective.  McIntyre is 
of the opinion that modernity’s lack of telos is essentially to blame for this self-
defeating moral relativism.  Modernity has, so to speak, lost its anchor in a 
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shared communitarian way of life, the basic perquisite for the “good life”.  For 
MacIntyre, being immersed in a communitarian way of life represents the nucleus 
of humankind’s ability to live well.  In this regard, a return to the “community” as 
the source of wisdom and virtue, the individual can combat the destructive effects 
of a mechanistic society driven by the impulses of selfish greed and self-
aggrandizement, made desirable by the laws of the “free” market system of 
capitalism.  In place of the idea of competitive success, MacIntyre seeks to 
restore the “traditional” values of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation.  The 
(economic-technical) power of progress as promised by modernity can only result 
in the moral-spiritual collapse of the modern individual.  As David Harvey puts it:  
 
There is a mode of vital experience – experience of space and time, 
of the self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils – that is shared 
by men and women all over the world today.  I will call this body of 
experience ‘modernity’, ‘To be modern is to find ourselves in an 
environment that promises adventure, power, joy, growth, 
transformation of ourselves and the world – and, at the same time, 
that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, 
everything we are.  Modern environments and experiences cut 
across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and 
nationality, of religion and ideology; in this sense, modernity can be 
said to unite all mankind.  But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of 
disunity; it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration 
and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish.  
To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, “all 
that is solid melts into air”. (Harvey 1989: 10-11)    
 
MacIntyre claims that modernity’s total reliance on scientific reason as a sole 
factor for gaining knowledge could be misleading, as it frequently results in 
imbalances.  This does not mean, however, that MacIntyre questions the 
significance of modernity’s revolutionary scientific discoveries.  More to the point, 
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MacIntyre feels that modern man has lost his spiritual bearings, given the 
mechanistic nature of modern psychology.  While MacIntyre acknowledges the 
groundbreaking events of the “age of reason” (Bauman 1987: 76), and the 
advances made by science, modernity is also blind to the moral significance of 
human solidarity as experienced, for example, in personal relationships of 
friendship, family ties and public associations.  These forms of solidarity are the 
cornerstones of our moral-political lives.  MacIntyre claims that the destabilizing 
effects of modernity are directly attributable to the structural (Institutional) 
changes that have taken place in the economic and political arenas.  In this 
regard, politics and economics, instead of being concerned with the wellbeing of 
its citizens in a political order of justice, have instead been reduced to the 
“technical management” of a consumerist society in which the individual is just 
another consumer or non-consumer in a market-driven mass society.  MacIntyre 
criticizes the function that the “manager” occupies in the workplace as modern 
society is handed over to the anonymous authority of state bureaucracy for 
guidance and leadership.  Organizations have accordingly developed into 
“specialist” ordered establishments, with its institutions governed by state rules 
as a substitute for religious authority.  MacIntyre is highly critical of a rule-
governed state and the introduction by the scientific community of “rational 
instrumentality” as the equivalent of wisdom in the modern age.  Zymunt Bauman 
cogently illustrates the significance of this point as follows: 
 
Control has been taken over by other forces – by autonomous 
institutions of specialized research and learning, needing no 
validation but that constantly replenished by their own, 
institutionally supported procedural rules, or by equally autonomous 
institutions of commodity production, needing no validation other 
than the productive potential of their own technology. (Bauman, 
1987: 158) 
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Despite the specific merits of individual autonomy, MacIntyre argues that mass 
mentality causes, in the first place, an environment that creates alienation not 
merely among fellow beings, but also between employer and employee, and a 
mass society based on capitalist materialist values can only exacerbate the 
division of material inequality between the “haves” and the “have-nots”.  The 
average individual with his or her “rights” must necessarily become a 
disillusioned cynic and misfit in a society that promises so much but delivers so 
little.  All that he or she has left to function in modern society is a legal sense of 
right and wrong; the moral values that ought to inform the legal institutions and 
political constitutions of the modern state, have simply been left “behind”, thus 
opening up a public domain where the “law of the jungle” is given respectability 
by the laws of the free market system.    
 
According to MacIntyre, with the rejection of earlier belief systems, the notion of 
arbitrariness has been introduced into Western civilization.  Modernity’s failure to 
produce a universal foundation of rationality capable of doing justice to the 
theoretical (scientific) and practical (moral-political) dimensions of human life has 
condemned modernity to failure.  The major consequence of this failure is the 
inability to reach agreement on the nature of the “good life” beyond the technical 
and economic realm of progress.  This has resulted in what Bernstein (1986a: 
135) has called “the rage against the Enlightenment”.   It is as if, in spite of all the 
promises of modern enlightenment, the moral ethos of modernity is increasingly 
characterized by apathy, cynicism and powerlessness as the modern individual 
can no longer find the moral-political resources to relate to the other as a fellow 
human being.   
 
3.3.1     Emotivism in perspective  
MacIntyre argues that the fact that “ethics is now fashionable ” (MacIntyre 1979: 
17) is indicative not only of the impermanence of modernity’s system of values, 
but also of the general acceptance of emotivism, the most fundamental 
characteristics of which are its individualism and its relentless pursuit of change 
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(for the sake of change).  MacIntyre singles out Max Weber as one of the most 
representative advocates of emotivism, given the latter’s claim regarding the non-
rational (or irrational or emotional) origin of values.  In connection with 
MacIntyre’s views on Weber it should be noted that Jürgen Habermas also refers 
to Weber in a similar manner insofar as he (Habermas) evaluates modernity in 
terms of the “deformed realization of reason in history”. (Bernstein 1984: 4)  In 
this regard, Habermas claims that the rationalization process requires not only 
‘the elaboration of categories and concepts for a systematic examination of the 
character and different modes of rationality, but an explanation of how they are 
concretely embodied in social and cultural life’. (Bernstein 1984: 4)  Besides, 
Habermas inquires whether one can claim that standards still exist, given that 
problems caused by emotivism have led to relativism and decisionism, hence 
promoting the stance that ‘ultimate norms are arbitrary and beyond rational 
warrantability’. (Bernstein 1984: 4)  We will discuss Habermas’s approach to the 
problem of emotivism in more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
In order to call attention to the significance of Weber’s “distinction between 
rational and non-rational discourse”, MacIntyre (1985: 30) asks his reader to 
reflect on three representative figures of modernity, namely, the “Aesthete”, the 
“Therapist” and the “Manager”.  Each of these figures embodies specific 
attributes the possession of which renders the practice and pursuit of morality 
extremely problematic.  For example, MacIntyre emphasizes the function of the 
“Manager” who, through his manipulative actions, exerts power and authority 
over his or her employees. This type of manipulati ve action is part of the modern 
corporate world.   More often than not, people take the managerial character as a 
role model because they are able or inclined to identify with this character, since 
the manager as a personality projects an irresistible image of power, authority 
and control.  In this regard, morality is identified with success and the domination 
of others.  The status and role of “the Manager” is legitimated by means of “moral 
fictions”. (MacIntyre 1985: 73)  Given the fact that the real motives are 
camouflaged in a bureaucratic oriented culture; ‘any genuine distinction between 
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manipulative and non-manipulative social relations’ (MacIntyre 1985: 23) 
becomes obscure.  Moreover, MacIntyre asserts that no rational argument can 
be rationally defended because the moral agent claims that the value of one’s 
actions can only be defended on “subjective” (that is, emotional) grounds or 
preferences.  Therefore MacIntyre maintains in After Virtue that Egon Bittner’s 
comment concerning Weber is justified.  As Bittner puts it: 
 
While Weber is quiet clear, … in stating that the sole justification of 
bureaucracy is its efficiency, he provides us with no clear-cut guide 
on how this standard of judgment is to be used.  Indeed, the 
inventory of features of bureaucracy contains not one single item 
that is not arguable relative to its efficiency function. (MacIntyre 
1985: 74-75)    
 
MacIntyre claims that besides emotivism, modernity must also face the dilemmas 
of moral relativism.   He argues that ‘our society stands at the meeting-point of a 
number of different histories, each of them the bearer of a highly particular kind 
of moral tradition, each of those traditions to some large degree mutilated and 
fragmented by its encounter with the others’. (MacIntyre 1979: 17)  For 
MacIntyre, modernity’s lack of language coordination is palpable proof of the 
fragmentary nature of its social structures.  It would seem as though modernity is 
guilty of having appropriated a category of virtues from another epoch, whilst at 
the same time, disregarding the historical and cultural context in which those 
virtues once enjoyed legitimacy.  This state of affairs, MacIntyre believes, can 
only lead to an ethos of moral uncertainty.  As he puts it: 
 
What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a 
conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from 
which their significance derived.  We possess indeed the simulacra 
of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions.  But 
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we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, 
both theoretical and practical, of morality. (MacIntyre 1985: 2)  
 
MacIntyre persistently argues that the devastating impact of emotivism on the 
project of modernity is the primary cause of its failure to create a communal bond 
of solidarity among its people.  In this regard, he argues that ‘all evaluative 
judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions 
of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or 
evaluative in character.   Particular judgments may of course unite moral and 
factual elements’. (MacIntyre 1985: 11-12)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s)    
 
From the perspective of his critique of emotivism, MacIntyre is of the view that 
the private nature of morality within the context of modernity makes it impossible 
to provide a universal basis for evaluating questions of “right and wrong”, thus 
giving rise to an interminable process of moral disagreements and disputes, the 
resolution of which is doomed to perpetual failure.  The phenomenon of moral 
relativism is therefore inseparably linked to the project of modernity.  In the final 
analysis, morality is a function of a particular situation, and the individual’s sense 
of morality will depend on strategic considerations aimed at successfully attaining 
a particular end. 
 
Whilst the theories of emotivism and relativism did not originate during the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they certainly acquired a new legitimacy 
within the context of modernity.  For Mac Intyre, however, the theory of emotivism 
is indicative of a moral degeneration that originated in modernity’s rejection of 
tradition.  More specifically, modernity’s inability to come to terms with its past 
has only served to uproot the modern individual from a meaningful (that is, 
humane) relationship and association. For MacIntyre, the “good life” is only 
possible in and through a meaningful and creative interaction with tradition; 
modernity’s disregard of tradition means that it cannot elevate itself to the level of 
human solidarity.  From this perspective, modernity is therefore enclosed within 
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itself, and it is basically characterized by a clash of incommensurable value 
systems.  In this regard, MacIntyre’s thinking is strongly reminiscent of Charles 
Taylor’s position when the latter asserts:   
 
Short of actually confronting a case of terminal incommensurability, 
evaluative strategies should assume the possibility of achieving 
universal understanding and validity.  … because he believes it is 
impossible to live one’s life meaningfully as a relativist.  Personal 
identity requires values with a constitutive meaning.  Therefore, 
these values cannot be held relatively but must be taken as having 
moral authority transcending a purely idiosyncratic perspective.  … 
when faced with significant cultural or moral conflict, one must 
adopt an absolute rather than a relative defense of the cultural 
values constitutive of one’s identity. (In Tate 1998: 20-
21)(Emphasis, Tate’s)  
 
It is worthy of note that Jean–Jacques Rousseau expresses the crux of the 
emotivistic attitude, when he substitutes Descartes’ celebrated dictum ‘I think 
therefore I exist,’ with ‘I feel therefore I exist’. (Harvey 1989: 19)  Even if, 
according to MacIntyre, emotivism has created numerous difficulties, is it not fair 
to say this theory brought about a major movement away from being primarily 
focussed on the reasoning faculty being the sole means of acquiring knowledge.  
Then again, keeping in mind MacIntyre’s intention to found morality on objective 
norms, the question is whether the emotivistic line of reasoning can ever be the 
right road to follow?  According to MacIntyre, this certainly is not the method to 
advance since he claims that establishing moral validity on preferences simply 
misconstrues the meaning of honouring values.  In this regard, he asserts that 
‘what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective 
will’. (MacIntyre 1985: 113)  In addition, he reminds the reader that objectivity can 
also be attained independently of pursuing a scientific approach.  This position is 
alluded to when he says that ‘we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth – 
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quite the contrary.  … we get conceptual relativity, and truth relative to a 
scheme‘. (Bernstein 1983: 76) 
 
At this juncture, it should be noted that owing to MacIntyre’s implicit rationale that 
everything is historically interconnected it is not surprising, regardless of his 
misgivings about emotivism, that he should make the claim that this theory too 
has a place in the societal narrative.  This attitude is shown in his comment, ‘let 
us instead consider emotivism as a theory which has been advanced in 
historically specific conditions’. (MacIntyre 1985: 14)  It is significant that for 
MacIntyre, invoking “subjective” grounds as the basis of morality is not an 
“individual” problem, but a societal problem.  As a result, he claims that the 
adoption of an emotivist stance should not remain uncontested because the 
negative effects derived from this approach are contradictory to exemplary and 
moral conduct.  Moreover, the inability to identify with a certain point of view, or 
be associated with a specific social group, creates a milieu that depends on 
frequently unacceptable choices being made. This in turn encourages a culture 
of endless contradictions that undermines the possibility of developing an 
authentic sense of “self”.   
 
Despite MacIntyre’s respect for the unique qualities of a person, he nonetheless 
disapproves of the damaging consequences of the autonomous individual’s 
emphasis on subjective preferences.  In order to corroborate his position that 
decisions are regularly determined from an individualistic perspective, he 
discusses the diverse attitudes involving abortions.  In this regard, for instance, 
he points out that if one is a follower of a certain religious group, then it is wrong 
to consent to an abortion.  On the other hand, the mother-to-be might argue that 
she has the final say.  In other words, the ‘absence of a shared rational criterion’ 
can lead to an ‘arbitrariness in each one of us – or so it seems’. (MacIntyre 1979: 
17)    
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Another negative factor resulting from emotivism is that, ironically, although 
modern society has become conscious of the necessity of moral practices yet, at 
the same time, it is unable to provide a suitable means to establish an ethical 
approach.  A possible explanation for this way of thinking is that the person 
displays an unconditional acceptance of his or her own egoism, and simply does 
what he or she prefers.  The individual furthermore reacts to experiences as 
dictated by inclinations and unfortunately, more often than not, without due 
consideration for another.  Regrettably this type of condition seems to be at the 
root of most debates where an exchange of ideas takes place, particularly on the 
subject of values.   
 
A further objection to emotivism is that when personal preferences are the 
yardstick whereby moral standards are to be evaluated, it simply presupposes a 
set of moral judgments regarding claims of right and wrong, without the 
possibility of adducing the principles in the light of which modernity can defend 
the ethical basis of such claims.  This in turn leads to contradictions and 
inconsistencies that exclude the possibility of resolution, thereby resulting in an 
“unprincipled” society.  As MacIntyre puts it:  
 
What is wrong with being morally unprincipled is not primarily that 
one is being inconsistent and it is not even clear that the 
unprincipled are inconsistent, for it seems to be the case that in 
order to be practically inconsistent, one first needs to have 
principles.   (Otherwise what is it about one that is inconsistent?)   
 
… where by “principled” we mean something much more than any 
notion of rationality can supply. (MacIntyre 1979: 18)(Emphasis, 
MacIntyre’s)  
 
We now turn to another aspect of MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, his 
assessment of the utilitarian ethical system.  
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3.3.2  Utilitarianism in perspective  
According to MacIntyre, utilitarianism is the inevitable and unavoidable 
articulation of emotivism.  It is a school of thought aimed at promoting “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Harold H. Titus and Morris Keeton 
1973: 153) of people, thus focussing on the feelings of the majority.  At the centre 
of this doctrine is the supposition that good consequences for the majority should 
be the gauge whereby wellbeing is judged.  Utilitarianism originated in Great 
Britain approximately at the end of the seventeenth century.  Some earlier major 
contributors were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) 
and Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900).  In line with the prevailing objectives of the 
Enlightenment Project, utilitarianism dismissed traditional values and claimed 
morality was predominantly motivated by what Jeremy Bentham (a universalistic 
hedonistic act utilitarian) says is at the source of an agent’s actions, namely, 
pleasure-seeking and the avoidance of pain.  At the root of the utilitarian doctrine 
is an image of “man” as a being driven by self-interest.    
  
Bentham maintains that hedonistic utilitarianism is a realistic doctrine since it 
highlights mankind’s basic nature and asserts that activities are morally 
acceptable or unacceptable in relation to the pleasure or pain that it produces, 
whereas George E. Moore, as an idealistic utilitarian, ‘will hold that the goodness 
or badness of a state of consciousness can depend on things other than its 
pleasantness.  … on various intellectual and aesthetic qualities’. …  He may 
even hold the idea that some pleasant states of mind can be intrinsically bad, 
and some unpleasant ones intrinsically good’. (J. J. C. Smart 1967: 207)  
Although there seems to be conflicting opinions regarding morality, utilitarianism 
suggests the application of a normative ethical structure on ‘how we ought to 
think about conduct, or it may be put forward as a system of descriptive ethics, 
that is, an analysis of how we do think about conduct’. (Smart 1967: 
207)(Emphasis, Smart’s)  However, the most significant sorts of utilitarianism 
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seem to be act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, which Smart describes as 
follows: 
 
Act-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an 
action is to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the 
action itself.  Rule-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness and 
badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should 
perform the action in like circumstances. (Jonathan Glover 1990: 
199) 
 
In so far as act-utilitarianism is concerned, actions that provide for the welfare of 
the greatest number is considered right, and wrong only if the smallest number 
receive benefits.  Besides, MacIntyre claims that utilitarianism is reminiscent of 
emotivism in that ‘no action is ever right or wrong as such’. (MacIntyre 1985: 
15)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s)  Rule-utilitarianisms, by and large, hold the stance 
that any action has a temporary status because its continuance is conditional 
upon the outcome.  In line with this reasoning, rules are subject to assessment 
and therefore review which, in turn, are dependent upon changing situations and 
events, and not on a fixed set of regulations.  From the previous statements it 
can be concluded that this standpoint would also be in direct contradiction to 
Kant’s way of thinking, because utilitarianism implies the possibility that, 
immorality could be condoned if it would, in spite of the circumstances, allow its 
basic principle to apply, namely, the attainment of happiness for the maximum 
number of participants.   
 
Another crucial feature of utilitarianism is that is holds an “impersonal moral view” 
(Michael Slote 1995: 892)(Emphasis, Slote’s) since it asserts that: 
 
our obligations depend on an impersonal assessment of the 
consequences of our actions, and if we have a choice between 
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doing more for strangers or less for ourselves …then we must give 
preference to the strangers. (Slote 1995: 892) 
 
However, this impartial stance towards “strangers” presents problems for 
ordinary common sense thinking as people normally regard the “self” and those 
who are close as being the most important, and because of this, should receive 
preferential treatment.  Utilitarians embrace this standpoint about others since it 
is assumed that everyone should be entitled to equal rights.  Furthermore, 
utilitarianism maintains that a strong point of this theory is the replacement of 
moral intuitions with a standardized method of solving moral issues that is 
grounded in the conception of “usefulness”.  Within this context, Bentham also 
claims that ‘our duty is to maximize the balance of pleasure over pain in life’. 
(Titus and Keeton 1973: 153)  The implication of this viewpoint with regard to 
ethical matters is also negative according to MacIntyre, since how can moral 
conduct be measured as good or even right on the basis of the following 
statement ‘If there is a balance in favor of pleasure, the act is a good act’. (Titus 
and Keeton 1973: 154)  In light of this assertion, Bernard Mayo (1986:40) claims 
a ‘good action is not the same as a right action’. 
 
MacIntyre asserts that the standpoint that, ‘Utilitarians perceive the self as 
always able to choose the most beneficial or least harmful course of action open 
to it, whatever that may involve the self in doing’ (MacIntyre 1979: 21)(Emphasis, 
MacIntyre’s) is unacceptable.  He rejects the claim that utility and consequences 
of actions of the majority should be judged as the basic criterion by which to 
evaluate whether something is good or bad.  For example, he is critical of 
George E. Moore’s argument that ‘every action is to be evaluated solely by its 
consequences’. (MacIntyre 1985: 15)  In accordance with this, MacIntyre states 
that to found a value system expressly on the notion of utility is inappropriate 
since some actions or functions do not automatically bring about the most 
favourable results.  Other attitudes that seem illogical to MacIntyre is the position, 
endorsed by utilitarians, namely, that it is rational to interfere with someone’s 
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“rights” merely for the sake of “utility”, and also the view that inclusion of the 
“telos”, as presented by Aristotle, is passé.  So, it is hardly surprising that he is 
critical of Jeremy Bentham’s thinking: 
 
His innovative psychology provided a view of human nature in the 
light of which the problem of assigning a new status to moral rules 
can be clearly stated; and Bentham did not flinch from the notion 
that he was assigning a new status to moral rules and giving a new 
meaning to key moral concepts.  Traditional morality was on his 
view pervaded by superstition; it is not until we understood that the 
only motives for human action are attraction to pleasure and 
aversion to pain that we can state the principles of an enlightened 
morality, for which the prospect of the maximum pleasure and 
absence of pain provides a telos. (MacIntyre 1985: 62)(Emphasis, 
MacIntyre’s) 
 
Within this context MacIntyre’s critical response to utilitarianism is further 
emphasized as he claims that, along with other reasons, this theory failed 
because Bentham and John S. Mill were unable to ‘provide an adequate 
foundation for the principle of utility and a way of connecting moral motivation 
with a psychology of self-interest’. (John Horton and Susan Mendus 1994: 141)  
In other words their theory lacks rational support as well as justification.  The 
counter-argument that both, Bentham and Mill present, namely, that given a 
specific situation concerning a reaction to an incident or reaching a conclusion 
about something, they point out that the agent ‘did not fail in their own terms’. 
(Horton and Mendus 1994: 132)  However, this kind of response does not hold 
since this rejoinder can be applicable or given to justify any form of practice or 
argument, and it is certainly not persuasive enough.    
 
In addition, there exist several other issues that MacIntyre finds problematic in 
connection with utilitarianism.  First, regarding utilitarianism and its view of moral 
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practices, MacIntyre holds that the theory of utilitarianism ‘cannot accommodate 
the distinction between goods internal to and goods external to a practice'. 
(MacIntyre 1985: 198)  For MacIntyre, this poses a problem since the internal 
and external properties of practices are vital for his critique that is centred on the 
collapse of values.  Second, regarding issues associated with liberalism and 
utilitarianism MacIntyre claims that ‘the debate between the deontological and 
utilitarian versions of liberal individualism actually masks the dominance of 
instrumental reasoning’. (Horton and Mendus 1994: 128)  What is more, taking 
into account his attitude towards instrumental reasoning, it makes sense that he 
is in disagreement with the position adopted by utilitarians concerning the 
appraisal of values.  MacIntyre argues:   
 
On a direct utilitarian view, moral evaluation is a form of 
instrumental evaluation: acts are not right or obligatory because of 
their inherent character, their underlying motives, or their relation to 
divine or social dictates, but because of how much overall human 
or sentient well-being they produce. (Slote 1995: 890)(Emphasis, 
Slote’s) 
  
Next, MacIntyre disapproves of the utilitarianism standpoint that suggests that 
agents operate in a rationally detached manner.  This view, however, is not in 
keeping with his beliefs because he claims that individuals belong to a unified 
communal structure, and as a result are predisposed towards cultural influences.  
And, finally, it is important to mention additional factors associated with 
MacIntyre’s views that are related to moral principles.  MacIntyre is of the view 
that objectivity can overcome moral scepticism.  The word scepticism is normally 
used to denote doubt or disbelief, and in certain instances, it is closely linked to 
the concept of relativism.  Indeed, moral scepticism is amenable to the notion 
that differences of opinion exist.  Since relativism is actually ‘a frame of mind 
reflecting a world in which no version of the truth or the supreme values of 
goodness or beauty enjoys the support of a power so evidently superior to any 
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rival powers that it may credibly claim its own superiority over alternative 
versions’ (Zymunt Bauman 1987: 84) and, so, relativism, in actual fact, reflects 
either consensus or differences of opinion with regard to a problem considered to 
be merely relative to a particular situation.  Whether a solution to a predicament 
is logically right or wrong does not seem to be the issue since truth is considered 
to be a separate factor.    
 
In spite of MacIntyre’s position regarding a traditional lifestyle he is well aware of 
the far-reaching influences of modernity, and that it is impossible to represent 
‘the world in a single language.  Understanding had to be constructed through 
the exploration of multiple perspectives’. (Bernstein 1985: 30)  MacIntyre 
concedes that ideas linked to a pluralistic society are here to stay.  As a result of 
these suppositions Neil Levy reasons that: 
  
The very pluralism which, MacIntyre believes, threatens to 
undermine the rationality of our moral judgments turns out to be a 
necessary ingredient of the supposedly unified traditions MacIntyre 
wishes to vindicate. (Levy 1999: 472)   
 
It is interesting to note a few other ideas regarding the concept of relativism and 
pluralism.  Amongst others, Bauman states in Legislatives and Interpreters: “On 
modernity, postmodernity, and intellectuals” (1984) that for Lonnie D. Kliever,  
relativism does not cause a problem because it should be perceived as an 
explication that allows for the accommodation of modernity’s pluralistic social 
system.  This point of view is expressed as follows:  
 
Pluralism is the existence of multiple frames of reference, each with 
its own scheme of understanding and criteria of rationality.  
Pluralism is the coexistence of comparable and competing 
positions which are not to be reconciled.  Pluralism is the 
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recognition that different persons and  different groups quite literally 
dwell in irreducibly different worlds. (Bauman 1987: 129)   
 
This position also seems to be reminiscent of Bernstein’s (1983: 30) belief that 
one can move beyond objectivism and relativism and, ironically, according to him 
an advantage of the theory of relativism is its focus on “multiple perspectives” as 
it provides a platform for the differences found in a pluralistic culture, which is 
undeniably a feature of the modern ethos and societal structure.    
  
3.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter we have presented MacIntyre’s analysis of the state of 
modernity’s moral decline.  His arguments are presented in a coherent and 
thought-provoking style and it is obvious that the situation of modernity has 
troubled him deeply.  Furthermore, he asserts that the failure of the 
Enlightenment Project is unavoidable mainly because of emotivism and 
utilitarianism, which have developed steadily as a result of the notion of individual 
autonomy whose moral capacity has been reduced to the supposedly inferior 
level of irrational preferences and emotions as the foundation of moral judgment.   
 
As a means to overcoming the “moral malaise” (J. B. Schneewind 1983: 525) of 
modern culture, MacIntyre advocates a reconsideration of Aristotelian ethics, with 
the inclusion of a traditional lifestyle so that human beings can hopefully function 
once again as historical-moral-political creatures; ideas that are undeniably also 
central to the communalistic aspects of Aristotle’s ethical-political philosophy.  In 
the following chapter, consideration will be given to MacIntyre’s attempt to 
rehabilitate the Aristotelian approach to society, conceptualized as a (historical) 
community.   
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Chapter Four 
 Society as a community:  MacIntyre’s attempt to reconstruct 
“the rational” within modernity 
 
             
4.1 Introduction 
Taking into consideration MacIntyre’s critique of modernity, in the preceding 
chapter, it seems quite natural that he should attempt to find answers for the 
destabilization of moral thinking that has come to characterize the culture of 
modernity.  In this regard, MacIntyre is particularly concerned about modernity’s 
overemphasis on a model of rationality that absolutises an instrumental mode of 
thinking geared towards the achievement of “progress” of a technical-scientific 
nature.  Given modernity’s epistemological framework in which the “subject” is 
basically in control of the “object”, in spite of various attempts to achieve a 
relational balance between the two poles of “subject and object”, the freedom of 
modernity to question everything amounts in fact to the freedom of the individual 
to assert his or her autonomy and independence from all forms of social and 
moral-political solidarity; hence the development of emotivism and liberalism as 
the appropriate forms of human conduct within modernity 
 
In this chapter, I will focus firstly on MacIntyre’s attempt to achieve a sense of 
moral-political unity within the context of modernity (4.2).  From this perspective, I 
propose to consider MacIntyre’s argument that the modern philosophical theory 
of a free-thinking individual has resulted in legacy of “criterionless” and adaptable 
moral standards, potentially capable of infinite revision and change, thereby 
reinforcing an ethos of moral indifference with regard to the question of unity and 
human solidarity.  In this regard, MacIntyre’s attitude concerning liberalism and 
his noticeable preference for a communitarian-based society will be explored in 
order to underline MacIntyre’s conception of human beings as primarily moral-
political agents immersed in a social and historical web of mutual obligation, 
respect and cooperation.   
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Secondly, in an attempt to counteract the dilemmas brought about by the 
changing dynamics of the current social structure (both sociological and 
philosophical in nature) MacIntyre maintains that a likely solution to the 
problematic situation would be the reintroduction of the ideals embodied in the 
classical Greek philosophical tradition, namely, a rehabilitation of Aristotelian 
ethics that could possibly ensure a process that ‘restores intelligibility and 
rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments’, (MacIntyre 1985: 
259) so that moral dignity is once more interwoven into the moral culture of 
modernity.  MacIntyre’s critical appropriation of Aristotelian ethical thinking will 
duly be discussed (4.3).  
 
Thirdly, in conjunction with MacIntyre’s suggestion that everything is basically 
historically and socially interlinked, three pertinent themes will be discussed, 
namely, the idea of a practices, the narrative unity of the self and, tradition as a 
solution to modernity’s moral-political inadequacies (4.4).  
             
4.2        The quest for unity   
Notwithstanding modernity’s claim to universality and equality, MacIntyre claims 
that the Enlightenment Project’s introduction of frequently unacceptable ideas 
has resulted in much of modern society’s dysfunctional conditions.  He is 
especially critical of the negative impact caused by the autonomous individual’s 
perception of their lifeworld, which paved the way for many changes and 
differences of opinion regarding authoritative standards related to ethical ideals 
and daily practices.  For MacIntyre, one of the most disturbing dilemmas, derived 
as a result of the “legacy of the Enlightenment”, (Harvey 1989: 41) was the 
stance adopted by modernity in its conclusion that the social sciences could 
basically be studied or assessed in terms of the instrumental rationality of 
scientific thinking.  For example, human functioning could be explicated in a 
manner similar to the workings of a mechanical object.  He claims that this 
outlook has dehumanized the essential nature of humans with frequently 
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regrettable consequences.  This passage below, in which Bernstein reflects on 
the impact of instrumental thinking on modernity, underlines MacIntyre’s general 
concerns: 
 
But when unmasked and understood, the legacy of the 
Enlightenment was the triumph of Zweckrationalati tät – purposive – 
instrumental rationality.  This form of rationality affects and infects 
the entire range of social and cultural life encompassing economic  
structures, law, bureaucratic administration, and even the arts.  The 
growth of Zweckrationalatität does not lead to the concrete 
realization of universal freedom but to the creation of an “iron cage” 
of bureaucratic rationality from which there is no escape. (Bernstein 
1984: 5) 
 
Regarding MacIntyre’s assertion that emotivism was a major cause in the 
breakdown of moral standards during the Enlightenment period, he, is actually 
saying that, in an emotivist environment, where the individual is largely absorbed 
with the “self” and subjective preferences, a variety of disturbing factors tend to 
emerge.  The agent’s inability to distinguish between personal and impersonal 
reasons perpetuates a social structure that creates manipulative interaction and 
association.  This situation is rendered worse given that people also tend to 
neglect to recognize the distinction between the meaning and use of moral 
utterances and consequently, they are unable to provide rational or logical 
criteria either to justify a moral judgment or to provide a coherent perspective on 
moral questions of “right and wrong”.  What is more, he maintains that emotivism 
is directly linked to liberalism and its absorption with the unencumbered “self”.  
The individual’s manner of behaviour suggests that no particular reason is 
necessary to explicate his or her actions, thus, leaving no legitimate basis for an 
objective account of morality.  With regard to this problem, MacIntyre is of the 
view that this attitude can only result in the breakdown of responsible moral 
actions within the context of modernity.  Furthermore, he declares that a 
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conceptual distinction between what a situation “is” and what it “ought to be” can 
only be meaningfully maintained in a context where a communally shared 
tradition of values precedes the instruction of such a conceptual distinction, in the 
first place, MacIntyre’s position is that modernity’s efforts to advance a system of 
rules that could possibly replace or transcend traditional values (shared by 
particular historical communities) is doomed to failure in view of the fact that rules 
can be altered and, more significantly, ‘they are never sufficient to determine how 
we ought to act’. (MacIntyre 1999: 93)  In line with this reasoning, MacIntyre 
argues that trust in and acceptance of the human being as a cultural and 
historical creature can overcome the “ghostly emotivist self”. (Mulhall and Swift 
1992: 80) 
 
Given MacIntyre’s emphasis on the historical and cultural dimensions of human 
existence, it is not difficult to understand why it is deemed important to establish 
rational principles of human conduct that transcend the devastating potential of 
modern individualism.  Beyond the modern individual lies a tradition of time-
honoured values, whose reintegration into the consciousness of modern “man” 
offers the possibility of overcoming the narrow conceptions of morality that 
currently enjoy pride of place.  The values are needed, according to MacIntyre, 
as a necessary foundation for moral-political unity; they can potentially 
counteract the moral experience of vertigo in a modern world seemingly 
incapable (at present) of dealing with its self-imposed confusion in the wake of its 
radical break with tradition.  What is the point of inventing and reinventing new 
images to make modernity look more “attractive” (as opposed to “legitimate”), 
when the underlying theme at the root of modernity’s inception is that the unity of 
the self lies in denying or rejecting the self’s moral links with the past?  The 
transitory nature of modernity (given its obsession with the “future” as the arena 
of progress) makes it difficult to safeguard any understanding or to offer support 
for the traditional bonds of our common heritage as human beings.  This situation 
might seem ironic since the Enlightenment era’s intention was to establish 
unchanging qualities (certainty), for example, by the introduction of a single 
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scientific method founded on reason.  However, to offset the destructive effects 
of emotivism and liberalism on modernity, MacIntyre aims to restore an objective 
as well as a realistic framework in which virtues can once again function 
meaningfully.  He argues, that these facets can be reclaimed through the 
inclusion of historical and traditional factors and a reinvestment in Aristotelian 
ethics and, at the same time he emphasizes the relevance of being attached to a 
communal lifestyle where a system of values can be nurtured.  For MacIntyre, 
unity bridges the gap between what has gone before and what happens at this 
moment in time, therefore, a ‘part cannot be understood without the whole’. 
(Bernstein 1983: 32)  Before we can fully appreciate this aspect of MacIntyre’s 
philosophy, however, we need to consider in some detail his assessment of the 
modern individual within the context of the liberal doctrine.  
             
4.2.1      MacIntyre’s views on liberalism   
MacIntyre’s assessment of liberalism is focussed on the moral implications of the 
modern philosophical conception of the self as an autonomous individual 
operating within a moral-political environment of entitlement.  For MacIntyre, the 
most significant implication is the real possibility of countless controversies and 
moral indifference in the face of the most crucial moral challenge: a sense of 
solidarity that reinforces our understanding of ourselves as interdependent moral 
beings.  Without this sense of moral interdependence, ethical thinking (within the 
context of modernity) amounts to nothing more than a meaningless process of 
argumentation with no overall context that is universally binding on the 
participants in various discourses on morality.  According to MacIntyre, this state 
of affairs is irrational, and he attributes the decisionistic irrationalism of modernity 
to its fundamental defense of an ahistorical, that is, non-traditional approach to 
dealing with questions of morality, given its commitment to a progressivistic 
understanding of rationality and knowledge, presented in the form of scientific 
thinking.  
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MacIntyre is of the view that the liberal’s attempt to found morality on principles 
that are committed to universal and impartial ideals of scientific thinking, can 
never succeed for as long as the historical and social aspects of our human-ness 
are ignored.  According to MacIntyre, a disregard for the past can only lead to the 
emergence of a culture in which the destructive elements of self-determination 
are allowed to flourish, thereby encouraging a constant engagement in 
irresponsible actions that promote the “symptoms of the emotivist disease”. 
(Mulhall and Swift 1992.77)  In keeping with MacIntye’s line of reasoning, this 
condition is aggravated by modernity’s dismissal of the past since, in principle, if 
there are no previous standards or acceptance of the ideas of our predecessors, 
on what legitimate grounds is it possible to legitimize liberalism as the best form 
of moral-political interaction.  The rationale behind this is that, for any logical 
discussion to get off the ground or be justified, some previous knowledge or 
shared starting point is essential.  Added to this dilemma is the fact that the 
modern individual chooses to become disengaged from participating in a 
communal lifestyle.  According to MacIntyre, this leads to the modern individual’s 
failure to perceive the unifying function that communities serve in reinforcing our 
interdependence as human beings.  His position is that values are nurtured in a 
social setting and, hence, the denial of a person‘s membership of the community, 
as a historical and moral-political being, makes no sense, since community-
participation provides the primary medium for the (moral) intersubjective 
development of the human being.  From this perspective, MacIntyre argues that 
the “liberal myopia” (Mulhall and Swift 1992: 93) hampers the individual’s 
realization of the merits of belonging.  Even though for MacIntyre, the community 
is ontologically and morally prior to the individual, it does not necessarily follow 
that individual life is to be understood only as a function or mechanical 
expression of the belief and knowledge systems of the community.  MacIntyre 
still wants to defend the intrinsic dignity of the individual, hence his claim that the 
‘self is a social product, but that [that] product is a unique person’. (Selznick 
1987: 447)  The child is initially initiated into a world of traditional values where 
his or her personality and social identity are formed; within the primary setting of 
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a parental group situation that can never be escaped, although it can be 
changed.  Therefore, MacIntyre asserts that discarding the fact that humans are 
social creatures is to distort the importance of intersubjective interaction and 
mutual relationships of love, friendship, solidarity, and sympathy with others.  
MacIntyre holds the view that if we refuse to acknowledge that communities have 
a purpose by simply insisting that only liberalistic viewpoints have legitimacy in 
the context of modernity, we condemn moral life to an arbitrary and meaningless 
exchange of viewpoints as a result of which the process of moral development is 
sacrificed to an intellectual process of endless debate.  The central importance 
that MacIntyre accords to the community as the primary medium of moral 
development is shared by Habermas who writes ‘We cannot understand the 
character of the life -world unless we understand the social systems that shape it, 
and we cannot understand social systems unless we see how they arise out of 
activities of social agents’. (In Bernstein 1984: 22)       
 
MacIntyre is particularly critical of the liberalistic approach that recognizes the 
agent’s right to make any decision that an agent might deem appropriate, since 
individuals behave as if any form of conduct is to be commended as long as the 
outcome is “successful”, that is, as long as the desired goal is achieved, the 
means is justified.  In keeping with this line of thinking, no history exists and the 
individual feels free to create his or her own “private space” which serves as the 
only legitimate source of his or her (strategic) being-in-the-world.  As a result, 
modern society is weakened by a monadic environment of unconnected selves 
motivated primarily by private (selfish) choices and so-called rights of entitlement.  
It is from this perspective that MacIntyre argues that morality is currently in a 
“state of crisis”.  Since there is no consensus of what is required for a virtuous 
life, the moral decisions typically made by the modern self are destructive of the 
possibility of a virtuous life.  As MacIntyre (1979: 22) puts it, ‘liberalism itself 
became foundationaless; and since the morality of our age is liberal we have one 
more reason to expect the search for the foundations of ethics to be 
unrewarded’.  In contrast to this situation, he argues that communities offer an 
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environment where objectivity and impartially may be upheld as ideals deemed 
essential to the moral development of the individual, which ideals, in MacIntyre’s 
view, pro vide the key to the development of a virtuous life.  Anything less than an 
informed commitment to the shared ideals of objectivity and neutrality is an 
illusion in which freedom becomes a new form of slavery.  In MacIntyre’s view, it 
is as if, ‘liberation leads to a new form of enslavement’. (Pippin 1991: 152)  In this 
regard it seems to be the case that the conceptions of liberty and equality are 
misinterpreted.  For instance, liberalism appears to promote random and 
inconsistent solutions and explanations to problems of a moral nature.  MacIntyre  
says that these problems arise in spite of liberalism’s support for the ideals of 
charity and fairness as the appropriate forms for the expression of the “good life”.  
In addition, MacIntyre is critical of a liberal social structure that claims pluralism 
poses no problem.  Liberals maintain that individuals have the right to choose 
their own good.  A similar form of pluralism is advocated by liberal thinkers, such 
as, John Rawls.  The undermentioned quote reflects the liberalistic outlook: 
 
As free persons, citizens recognize one another as having the 
moral power to have a conception of the good.  This means that 
they do not view themselves as inevitably [unavoidably as you 
might expect] tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the 
good and its final ends which they espouse at any given time.  
Instead, as citizens, they are regarded as, in general, capable of 
revising and changing this conception on reasonable and rational 
grounds.  Thus it is held to be permissible for citizens to stand apart 
from conceptions of the good and to survey and assess their 
various final ends. (Will Kymlicka 1990: 202)  
 
But, as MacIntyre asserts, this actually presents a problem since the liberal 
subject is left to his or her own devices when deciding questions of right and 
wrong, in total disregard of the time-honoured values of the community as a 
source of guidance and wisdom.   
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In his critique of liberalism, MacIntyre declares that it is impossible to realize 
complete neutrality in the political arena.  To be totally detached from or impartial 
to what is actually taking place is not feasible since it has been shown that 
historically, allegiance to certain prior happenings and activities ideally serves not 
merely members of a community, but also promotes the advancement of each 
citizen.  Also, political as well as ethical ideas cannot be separated from local 
cultures since good governance and values facilitate mutual understanding and 
the flourishing of a civilization.  MacIntyre stresses that instead of liberalism 
advancing a democratic standpoint it seemed this is no longer possible because 
people who are part of the democratic way of life are apparently more concerned 
with serving their own interests, therefore, political pursuits are ‘instrumentally 
degraded and bureaucratically marginalized’. (MacIntyre 1985: 227)  This has led 
humankind to become engrossed in technocratic procedures and indifferent to 
questions of value.  In order to avoid this situation, MacIntyre believes that if 
modern society is to succeed in minimizing the destructive impact of liberalism as 
it finds expression in the capitalist system, on the one hand, and in a technocratic 
ethos in which “science” is worshipped as the neutral (value-free) discipline of 
progress and success, on the other hand, it needs to be grounded in principles of 
ethical thinking capable of producing ideas that transcend the modern individual’s 
egoistic focus on the “self”.  To this end, MacIntyre turns to the ethical writings of 
Aristotle for inspiration.  
             
4.3 MacIntyre’s debt to Aristotelian ethics 
According to MacIntyre, the general rejection of the Aristotelian system of ethics 
is simply another manifestation of modernity’s elevation of itself as the privileged 
centre of reason and rationality.  The most important consequence of modernity’s 
self-definition as a self-sufficient category (in the historical as well as 
philosophical sense) is that the idea of history and tradition is, in principle, ruled 
out; hence the need for modernity constantly to reinvent itself.  With the purpose 
of redeeming moral principles within the context of modernity, MacIntyre 
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advocates a return to Aristotle’s philosophy, or “something very like it”. 
(MacIntyre 1985: 118)  In pursuit of this task, MacIntyre declares that it is crucial 
to analyze and reinterpret Aristotle’s original text (and context) in such a way that 
we do not lose sight of Aristotle’s original philosophical intent: to establish the 
conditions necessary for the development of a virtuous life within the Greek city-
state.  MacIntyre identifies two advantages in the Aristotelian approach: first and 
foremost, if pursued, it provides a model of ethical thinking with the potential of 
reversing the individualistic (and the accompanying decisionistic) elements of the 
modern liberal culture, secondly, it serves as an example of how to nurture 
respect for traditional values and practices in a social and political environment 
where the individual sense of self-worth, dignity and identity is sanctioned within 
the broader context of society as a community of interdependent and cooperative 
human beings. 
 
The focal point of Aristotle’s ethics is its teleological emphasis and belief in the 
essential nature of humans, defined as rational beings, each with the potential to 
reach self-fulfillment.  The difficult balance between ‘man-as-he-happens-to-be 
and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature’ (MacIntyre 1985: 52) 
is at the centre of Aristotelian ethics; this transition requires practical reason in 
the face of concrete lived-experience.  According to Aristotle, ethical thinking is of 
a “practical’ nature and, as such it requires a “practical” form of rationality to 
guide the individual in his or her search for moral excellence.  There is therefore 
a clear conceptual distinction for Aristotle between the “theoretical” reason that 
we normally associate with the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the 
“practical” reason, that we associate with the human potential for moral 
excellence.  For Aristotle, the idea of the realization of one’s moral potential as 
an individual is cast within the ethical context of teleological thinking in terms of 
which the individual is challenged to develop his or her the unique talents and 
capabilities in the service of the community.  From this perspective, the idea of 
fulfilling one’s potential cannot therefore be separated from the idea of serving 
the community: the one idea necessarily implies the other.   
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In his inspired work, Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out his views on ethical 
ideals that are not only applicable to everyday activities, such as, social and 
political matters, but which also demonstrate their universal appeal.  Basically, 
his notions show that upholding virtues produces eudaimonia, (the attainment of 
happiness is of central concern to Aristotle) which enables humankind to become 
conscious of their essential nature within the context of their moral interaction 
with other human beings.  Even though Aristotle’s ethical position is primarily 
teleological in character, it should be noted that he does not explicitly make an 
unambiguous distinction between the “good for man” and “exercise of the 
virtues”. He maintains that:  
 
[T]he exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a means to the end 
of the good for man.  For what constitutes the good for man is a 
complete human life lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues 
is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life.  We thus cannot 
characterize the good for man adequately without already having 
made reference to the virtues.  And within an Aristotelian 
framework the suggestion therefore that there might be some 
means to achieve the good for man without the exercise of the 
virtues makes no sense. (MacIntyre 1985: 149)(Emphasis, 
MacIntyre’s)    
 
These philosophical viewpoints highlight Aristotle’s thoughts on what it means to 
be a “good man”; humans have a purpose and can move from an untutored self 
to a tutored self.  Within this process agents are able to express themselves not 
merely as unique individuals but also as unique members of a communal group, 
where a variety of practices establish the person’s identity as well as position in a 
particular community.  MacIntyre emphasizes the point that these conditions 
were preserved in pre -modern society within the framework of the polis, whereas 
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in a modern society individuals, more often than not, function in isolation.  
Furthermore, to call something good or bad in pre-modern society meant in 
reality that these pronouncements have an objective validity.  Traditional moral 
statements could be considered to be true or false, good or bad, right or wrong, 
in a manner that transcended the narrow interests of the self-absorbed individual.   
 
Even though MacIntyre wishes to attain a similar situation in the modern moral 
environment, he does not really defend the notion of an “essential nature”, but he 
does seek to introduce a normative context aimed at justifying the transition from 
the “is” level of descriptive scientific thinking to the “ought” level of normative 
ethical thinking.  Given this distinction, MacIntyre proceeds to consider the 
possibility of reintroducing the Aristotelian notion of telos, albeit in modified form, 
in the hope of overcoming the liberal idea of an ahistorical human subject (the 
emotivist self), thereby providing the space for a reconsidering of the self from 
the point of view of history and tradition.  At the root of MacIntyre’s ethical project 
is the idea of unity within the self and unity with others.  This approach is strongly 
reminiscent of Plato’s idea of justice-as-harmony, as elaborated in The Republic.  
MacIntyre does indeed acknowledge his debt to Aristotle’s mentor when he 
points out that, for Plato, [the] ‘virtues are not merely compatible with each other, 
but the presence of each requires the presence of all’. (MacIntyre 1985: 142)  
This idea of the unity of the virtues, which is also supported by Aristotle, 
completely contradicts the modern conception of virtue.  In this regard, MacIntyre 
writes:   
 
[V]ariety and heterogeneity of human goods are such that their 
pursuit cannot be reconciled in any single moral order and that 
consequently any social order which either attempts such a 
reconciliation or which enforces the hegemony of one set of goods 
over all others is bound to turn into a straitjacket … (MacIntyre 
1985: 142)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s)   
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The above quote reinforces modernity’s perspective, in accordance with the 
liberalistic viewpoint, that mora l choices cannot implicitly be said to be either 
good or bad choices or decisions.  However, this is an outlook that MacIntyre 
certainly is not in agreement with since, for him, separation of factual elements 
from an appraisal whether something is true or false is unacceptable.  In 
MacIntyre’s view, in the Homeric culture, for example, the individual accepted 
that every moral act was linked with a particular communal lifestyle.  In other 
words virtues were interpreted as representing a way of conduct that enabled the 
person to perform his or her social functions, that is, virtues were appraised 
within a social framework.  Furthermore, in the ancient Greek tradition, the 
pursuit of a virtuous life was the only path to the realisation of one’s “essential 
nature”.  Given this approach, the interpretation of moral conduct can only take 
place within the context of the individual’s participation in the polis (the political 
community) because the realisation of the “essential self” as a moral being goes 
hand in hand with one’s contribution towards the preservation of the community, 
there is therefore no distinction between the individual as a “moral being”, on the 
one hand, and a “political being” on the other hand.  MacIntyre is indeed 
sympathetic towards the Greek conception of man; as he puts it, the ‘relationship 
between being a good citizen and being a good man becomes central’. 
(MacIntyre 1985: 133)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s) 
 
With reference to communities, it should be noted that crucial differences exist 
between the ancient societies and the modern liberal state.  These dissimilarities 
are not just about the construction of society, but in the distinct differences 
between objectives and ideals.  For example, according to Aristotle, the polis 
encompasses the “whole of life” and includes a range of standards and shared 
purposes to set up communities.  While recognizing that conflict or disunity is 
indeed an inescapable dimension of human existence, Aristotle does believe that 
conflict for its own sake can only lead to  the destruction of the community, hence 
the importance of the virtue of “friendship”, which for him as well as Plato, is the 
“highest” and “noblest” form of love.  When the virtue of “friendship” is cultivated 
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in the service and pursuit of objective ideals aimed at preserving the life (or 
flourishing) of the community, then we have a society in which the “good” takes 
us beyond the egotistical needs and ambitions of an insolated individual.  
According to Aristotle, communal existence should involve a common project that 
permits human flourishing and ordinarily incorporates a bond of friendship that 
provides harmony within the community.  What is more, Aristotle claims that 
failure and conflict are caused by imperfections in a person’s personality and the 
way to overcome this negative situation is not merely by means of a person’s 
metaphysical and reflective nature, but by adopting a “practical” approach to the 
attainment of happiness; this “practical approach” emphasizes the person’s 
inseparable ties with other members of the community.  Although the pursuit of 
virtue cannot be separated from the human desire for happiness, the medium for 
the attainment of happiness-as-virtue includes the social (friends and family), and 
the political (the preservation of life of the community as a whole).   It is from this 
perspective that Aristotle conceives of human freedom as the freedom to pursue 
the good life, because the good cannot be separated from the political.  This 
point is particularly important to Mac Intyre’s position, when he writes:  
 
What are political relationships?  The relationships of free men to 
each other, that is the relationship between those members of a 
community who both rule and are ruled over. The free self is 
simultaneously political subject and political sovereign.  Thus to be 
involved in political relationships entails freedom from any position 
that is mere subjection.  Freedom is the presupposition of the 
exercise of the virtues and the achievement of the good. (MacIntyre 
1985: 159) 
 
In spite of MacIntyre’s admiration for Aristotle’s moral-political views, it should be 
pointed out that he (MacIntyre) does not support the Greek philosopher’s views 
on the question of “slaves and barbarians”.  For Aristotle, there is a “natural” 
distinction between the “civilized and rational” creature of the Greek polis, and 
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those “non-Greeks” who, by implication, lack the rational capacity of the Greek 
citizen.  This is surely the first “official” expression of philosophical racism in 
terms of which reason is the exclusive privilege and monopoly of a certain “race”, 
to the exclusion of other “races”.  In this aspect of Aristotle’s thinking we find the 
early beginnings of a type of racist thinking that was to find resonance later in 
Western politics of domination and conquest of the non-Western world.   
 
It should be pointed out that MacIntyre condemns the Aristotelian thesis that 
certain individuals are slaves “by nature” (MacIntyre 1985: 160), as well as the 
implication arising from this thesis, namely, that non-Greeks (read non-
Westerners), lack the rational capacity for a virtuous life within the context of a 
political community.  For Aristotle, the absence of a political life testifies to the 
absence of the “essential nature” of human-ness.  It confirms that the “other” 
(non-Greek) is not fully human – hence the justification of slavery.  For Aristotle, 
not to belong to a community (in the Greek sense) is not to belong to “the human 
family” .  He says that ‘a human being separated from the polis is thereby 
deprived of some of the essential attributes of a human being’. (MacIntyre 1988: 
96)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s)  This is a very debatable point even though the 
Athenian society might define personhood in this manner it does not mean that 
reason can only flourish in the Greek philosophical tradition.   
 
According to Aristotelian conception of ethics, the nature of one’s friendship with 
others will determine whether one eventually becomes a good or a bad person.  
In this regard, Aristotle claims that a good person is unable to form a bond of 
friendship with a bad man.  Aristotle accordingly accounts for human evil in terms 
of human relationships, and since the “divine element” of reason resides in the 
soul of every human being, to act against one’s friends is to “sin” against God.  
As MacIntyre puts it, to rebel against ‘divine law’ [is to rebel against] ‘human law 
insofar as it is the mirror of divine law’. (MacIntyre 1985: 175)  From this 
perspective, true friendship includes the “divine”, and MacIntyre claims, 
furthermore, that the ‘bond of authentic friendship is a shared allegiance to the 
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good’. (MacIntyre 1985: 174)  It is the Aristotelian notion of friendship within the 
community that forms the basis of Mac Intyre’s attempt to overcome the 
destructive impact of liberalism, as the defining feature of modernity.   
 
4.4 Modern society as a community  
From the foregoing evaluation it cannot be denied that MacIntyre’s opposition to 
liberalism and emotivism stems from a profound appreciation of the integrative 
potential of the communitarian approach to morality and politics.  In keeping with 
Aristotle’s basic position, MacIntyre suggests that the possibility of a 
communitarian approach should seriously be considered if modernity is to move 
beyond the devastating consequences of its reduction of rationality to the level of 
instrumental thinking.  It is the search for a more comprehensive conception of 
rationality, one that includes a more comprehensive conception of moral-political 
life that provides the impetus for MacIntyre’s critique of a scientific-technically 
driven society that modernity has become.  MacIntyre’s critique of modernity 
must therefore be interpreted in the light of his attempt to do for modernity, what 
Aristotle did for the Greek city-state, namely, provide meaningful and coherent 
social structures, effective economic and political institutions aimed at the pursuit 
of the virtuous life within the broader context of the life of the community.  To this 
end, MacIntyre introduces the notions of “practice”, the “unitary self”, and 
“tradition”, in the light of which we will now discuss his attempt to redeem 
modernity.   
 
4.4.1  The idea of practices 
In MacIntyre’s attempt to restructure modern society, he critically appropriates 
the Aristotelian idea of “practice”.  It should be noted that the idea of “practice” 
presupposes an appreciation for the “historical narrative” as the medium for a 
meaningful integration of “tradition” into central social structures of modernity.  
For MacIntyre, the notion of “tradition” necessarily presupposes openness and 
receptivity to the wisdom of previous generations.  Tradition is very relevant since 
it offers a concrete starting point for the cultivation of good practices, that is, the 
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socialization of the individual with a view to inculcating habits of social 
responsibility and obligations.  In this regard, the priority of the community over 
the individual is duly acknowledged in a practical manner.  According to 
MacIntyre, it is ‘only when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart 
from all roles that ‘man’ ceases to be a functional concept’ (MacIntyre 1985: 59) 
and as a result unnecessary conflict usually follows. 
 
In view of the fact that practices have a strong historical element, MacIntyre 
asserts that anybody, who wishes to participate in some practice, should also be 
willing to accept the authority of someone who is equipped with superior 
knowledge.  A crucial advantage in accepting a knowledgeable instructor’s 
advice is that this discourages any emotivist or random opinion or attitude to 
interfere with the correct performance of an activity.  He states that the notions of 
internal and external facets are vital to understanding the full meaning of a 
practice.  MacIntyre explains what he means by a “practice” as follows: 
 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form 
of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are  
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with 
the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. (MacIntyre 1985: 187)   
 
In addition, MacIntyre  holds the view that virtues are a necessary component of 
practices.  This comment reflects his view that ‘A virtue is an acquired human 
quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those 
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents 
us from achieving any such goods’. (MacIntyre 1985: 191)(Emphasis, 
MacIntyre’s)  Thus, according to MacIntyre, virtues facilitate the acquisition of 
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certain goods that are said to be intrinsic to practices as well as offer reasons as 
to why certain actions are more suitable than others.  Besides, to engage in 
practices implies “to fill a set of roles”. (Mulhall and Swift 1992: 79)  MacIntyre 
holds the view that a practice becomes meaningless when it can no longer be 
attached to a worthwhile end.  As he puts it:   
 
[U]nless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of 
practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good 
of a human life conceived as a unity, it will both be the case that a 
certain subversive arbitrariness will invade the moral life and that 
we shall be unable to specify the context of certain virtues 
adequately. (MacIntryre 1985: 203)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s)   
 
Since no single practice is capable of coping with all aspects of what is 
worthwhile, MacIntyre turns to examine additional ideas involved in attaining a 
coherent or “whole” life.  Human beings cannot be judged merely by their 
physical activities; mental as well as spiritual elements must also be taken into 
account.  As indicated by MacIntyre, if any understanding is to be achieved about 
what it means to be human, not just intentions and actions should be investigated 
but also the “setting of the action”. (Mulhall and Swift 1992: 86)  With regard to 
the argument regarding the quest for a life that reaches its “full” potential, 
MacIntyre invokes the idea of narrative history to provide the desired point of 
departure for the development of a historical consciousness on the part of the 
“unitary” self.   
 
4.4.2 The narrative unity of the self 
How does one achieve unity?  From the Aristotelian perspective, it seems to be 
the case that to be constantly immersed in moral tasks makes it possible for 
humans to become whole.  Likewise, MacIntyre states that unity consists of “a 
narrative embodied in a single life”. (MacIntyre 1985: 218)  In both assertions 
there is the basic contention that the self is interlinked with others and, as a 
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consequence, when an individual behaves in a proper manner there is always 
the likelihood, or perhaps hope, that similar actions can be expected of others, in 
spite of the fact that social circumstances might differ.  MacIntyre explains this 
viewpoint as follows:  
 
For I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only 
qua individual.   This is partly because what it is to live the good life 
concretely varies from circumstance to circumstance even when it 
is one and the same conception of the good life and one and the 
same set of virtues which are being embodied in a human life.  … 
not just that different individuals live in different social 
circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own 
circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity.  I am 
someone’s son or daughter, ...  I am a citizen of this or that city … 
(MacIntyre 1985: 220)(Emphasis, MacIntyre’s)    
 
This citation is a significant aspect of MacIntyre’s philosophy since he declares 
that this individual’s concrete position in society ought to be respected, which 
means that the striving for moral excellence must take into account the concrete 
circumstances of every individual.  This “taking into account of the individual’s 
circumstance” is just another way of restating the “golden rule” as an appropriate 
moral basis for sympathizing or empathizing with others.   
 
 MacIntyre supports Michael Sandel’s assertions that the ‘unity of a virtue in 
someone’s life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can 
be conceived and evaluated as a whole’. (Sandel 1984: 126)  For instance, right 
actions originate from being conscious of one’s authentic identity, which is 
usually made known to others through personality characteristics and 
participation in certain social roles.  This does not actually mean that beings need 
to remain in a particular position, nor does it entail acceptance of any limitations 
that the individual might encounter, since progress and change are always 
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possible.  With special reference to communities, MacIntyre asserts that these 
structures provide an area to search for our true identity as the basis of self-
esteem.  Charles Taylor expresses a similar point of view in his Sources of the 
Self : The Making of the Modern Identity .   
 
People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or 
spiritual commitment, say as a Catholic … .   Or they may define it 
in part by the nation or tradition they belong to, … .  What they are 
saying by this is … that this provides the frame within which they 
can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or 
worthwhile, or admirable, or of va lue. (Taylor 1989: 27)   
 
MacIntyre draws attention to the fact that pre-modern society’s commitment to 
customary values and traditional practice provided a meaningful foundation for 
the development of a unified self.  However, modern mankind’s existence has 
become fragmented.  The modern self claims its identity from a “self-that-
decides-to-be”.  Factors that have contributed to this situation are, firstly, the 
disconnectedness and separatedness of the modern self, thus leading to 
loneliness and the promotion of egotistical tendencies; secondly, the dismissal of 
a communal culture, where unity and mutual interests are relevant, resulting in 
the dominance of modernity’s atomistic (liberal) society; thirdly, a division 
between the individual and his or her social roles, resulting in a general 
pathology of schizophrenia.  According to MacIntyre, a consistent narrative of a 
single life is lacking within the structures of modernity, given the latter’s 
acceptance of an ahistorical conception of the self (disembodied and 
fragmentary) as the norm.  In this regard, MacIntyre reminds us that ‘to try to cut 
myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present 
relationships.  The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a 
social identity coincide’. (In Schneewind 1982: 660)  It is therefore to be 
expected, according to MacIntyre, that the modern self cannot even be perceived 
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as having the ability to realize the moral ideals implicit in the Aristotelian system 
of virtues.   
 
How people relate to one another, as well as how one personally reacts to good 
or bad experiences, not only shapes the individual, but also enables others to 
form an opinion about who we are since ‘our lives are enacted narratives in 
which we are both characters and authors; a person is a character abstracted 
from a history’. (Mulhall and Swift 1992: 87)  Given the argument that each 
person has an identity it should also be noted that everyone participates in 
society on two levels.  Firstly, individuals act out their lives as subjective entities, 
that is, in a private capacity and are normally considered an unknown persona 
and, secondly, as a public figure it is possible to recognize an individual not 
simply in terms of his or her unique external characteristics, but also from the 
point of view of his or her respect for shared understandings and vision that 
authenticate a particular cultural tradition.  MacIntyre therefore believes that we 
are conditioned by previous experiences and events and that historical linkage 
provides unity and social identity to a single life.   
 
In conjunction with discovering who we are, human beings ordinarily think or 
recognize that they have some duty towards society as well as a need to belong.  
To stand completely apart leaves the person with a feeling of disconnectedness 
and loss, a loss of what it means to be truly human.  And, it is for this reason that 
MacIntyre maintains that individuals are dependent on communication, that is, on 
a public forum for debate and dialogue.  Taylor also supports the “dialogical 
character” of language by claiming that ‘[w]e become fully human agents, 
capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an identity, through 
our acquisition of rich human languages of expression’. (Andrew Jason Cohen 
1999: 131)  Whereas thinking or reflecting is a private attribute, languages are 
essentially a public means of exchanging ideas, especially those ideas that have 
a bearing on the human need for recognition, identity and social justice in a world 
that we share with others.  In the public forum, true “progress” must not only 
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indicate “where we are going”, it must also indicate “where we come from”, hence 
the importance of tradition.  
             
4.4.3 Tradition as a solution to modern inadequacies                  
With regard to all happenings, whether reference is made to traditions, value 
systems or discoveries, everything is necessarily understood or revealed within 
the context of a specific (concrete, historical, cultural) hermeneutic framework.  
Given this perspective, MacIntyre states that we all ‘inherit a variety of debts, 
rightful expectations, and obligations from our families, cities, and nations, and 
that these inheritances constitute the moral particularity of our lives, which he 
refers to as our “moral starting point”.’ (Michael Kelly 1989-90: 70)  Traditions do 
not merely imply a set of customs and beliefs that members of a society share 
throughout a considerable period of time that naturally ‘extend beyond the 
cognitive sphere to embody actual forms of life and reflect this wider material 
background’ (Tate 1998: 25), but also provide the individual with a concrete 
background to discover who they are, as a subjective being as well as a social 
being.   With reference to the aforesaid, MacIntyre c laims that:  
 
A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition.  Within a tradition the pursuit of goods 
extends through generations, sometimes through many 
generations.  Hence the individual’s search for his or her good is 
generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined 
by those traditions of which the individual’s life is a part, and this is 
true both of those goods which are internal to practices and of the 
goods of a single life. (MacIntyre 1985: 222) 
 
While MacIntyre recognizes the accomplishment of the natural sciences, he 
maintains that modernity’s failure has further been reinforced by its breaking 
away from traditional values.  He maintains that people need to concede that a 
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historical frame of reference undoubtedly plays a significant part in each life.  
Tradition allows human beings to become mindful of their legacy (and hence 
identity), and in the process of self-discovery become empowered to act 
meaningfully, and with conviction.  From this perspective, unity of the self begins 
with the forging of a historical link between the individual’s life and that of the 
community at large.  It is in this regard that MacIntyre  stresses the importance of 
storytelling as the most effective means of developing a moral-historical 
consciousness.  Instead of the dull, didactic and abstract moral treatises that 
invariably prove to be ineffective, MacIntyre recommends the art of storytelling 
for the moral development of the modern “self”, since, ‘man is in his actions and 
practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal’. (MacIntyre 
1985: 216)   
 
Finally, it should be noted that for MacIntyre, the notions of “tradition” and 
“reason” are not mutually exclusive.  He defends the view that ‘it is traditions 
which are the bearers of reason’. (Bernstein 1983: 77)  From this perspective, 
rational arguments are “tradition-bound”, that is, they have their origins in a 
cultural tradition, and the critical evaluation of the “traditional” perspective, at the 
level of practical discourse, can only take place with due regard for the historical 
context of its emergence within the community.  Without the experiences and 
information of the past it is difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate an argument 
or understand certain events and be in a position to provide rational justification 
for a particular course of action or decision.  MacIntyre therefore rejects the 
argument that liberalism is not a tradition.  As he puts it, ‘modern liberalism, born 
of antagonism to all tradition, has transformed itself gradually into what is now 
clearly recognizable even by some of its adherents as one more tradition’. 
(MacIntyre 1988: 10)  There fore, liberalism ‘has constituted itself as a tradition 
precisely by creating its own normativity out of itself’. (Kelly 1990: 71)   
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4.5       Conclusion 
MacIntyre’s contributions to the contemporary “liberal-versus-communitarian” 
debate are indeed invaluable.  Of primary importance, for MacIntyre, are the 
distinct approaches adopted by both social structures.  Despite his belief in 
individual autonomy and freedom of expressions, he is critical of liberalism’s 
determined effort to focus mainly on the “self” that has resulted in an emotivistic 
outlook.  From his appraisal of communitarianism it is obvious that he is in 
agreement with their aims to foster communities where humankind’s ethical 
legacy is upheld so that the degeneration of moral values and social relationships 
may be prevented.   
 
In pre-modern times, civilizations endeavoured to create a social and political 
environment of unity within society by their persistence in upholding moral 
principles, the significance of which was believed to transcend the narrow sphere 
of individual self-interest, the primary source of social conflict.  However, in 
contrast to this situation, MacIntyre claims that modernity has lost the notion of 
unity and therefore its moral foundation.  And, it is for this very reason that 
MacIntyre tries to transform and rehabilitate modern thinking by integrating 
Aristotle’s ideals that guide one towards a common good.  The main objective of 
this is to assist humans to try and rediscover their ultimate nature.  This 
MacIntyre believes can be best achieved by involvement in long-established and 
shared practices within a communal setting.  As regards the relevance of the 
Aristotelian ethical system to the modern away of life, it has frequently been 
argued that Aristotle’s views on the “good life”, as well as his account of moral 
customs and social unity are rather naïve and simplistic.  However, despite the 
reservations that contemporary thinkers may have about the possibility of its 
application within the context of modernity in this regard, it should be pointed out 
that MacIntyre is not looking for a wholesale importation of Aristotelian thinking; 
he is aware that this is impossible and that modernity’s historical consciousness 
is radically differe nt, but this should not blind us to the fact that we are essentially 
creatures of history.   
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Although MacIntyre presents cogent arguments regarding the deterioration of 
moral standards during modernity and his belief that morality can be redeemed 
within a traditional environment, he nevertheless fails to provide rational 
foundations for his defense of modernity as a product of history.  The question 
that needs to be asked is whether reason, as the defining characteristic of 
modernity can provide a rational defense of its historical consciousness within 
the conceptual framework of modernity.  We will address this question in Chapter 
Five.   
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Chapter Five 
  An alternative approach to the question of modernity 
      
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Four, I discussed MacIntyre’s proposal to resolve modernity’s moral 
dilemmas from the perspective of his critical appropriation of the Aristotelian 
system of ethics, with a view to developing his own ethical ideas of practices, 
unity of the self, and tradition.  He highlighted that a communal way is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the development of a virtuous life.  
MacIntyre’s critique of the Enlightenment Project has duly been noted, especially 
his views on the privileging of science, as the only legitimate model of rationality, 
knowledge, and truth.  MacIntyre is of the opinion that if the model of 
instrumental-scientific is absolutised to the disregard of other (equally legitimate) 
forms of knowledge and understanding, the historical-moral dimensions of human 
existence will inevitably lose their significance, thus reducing ethical thinking to 
an instrumental rationality aimed at the egotistical and strategic pursuit of 
individual self-interest.  Modernity’s rejection of its historical heritage, the belief 
that (scientific) reason is the sole means of acquiring knowledge, the view that 
the scientific method can be applied indiscriminately to both the  natural and 
human-social sciences, as well as its uncritical acceptance of liberalism as the 
only legitimate form of moral-political interaction, have all been discussed, not so 
much with a view to declaring MacIntyre an enemy of modernity, but rather to 
underline my basic argument, namely, that MacIntyre’s critique of modernity 
forms part of a larger ambition: to overcome the destructive elements that 
currently doom modernity to failure.  To this end, MacIntyre has sought to 
rehabilitate the philosophical idea of “tradition”, as the historical medium for 
modern “man’s” rational development as a moral-political being.  The question I 
seek to address in this regard is whether MacIntyre does in fact succeed in 
overcoming the problems generated by modernity’s overemphasis on a model of 
technical-scientific rationality, in other words, I seek to establish whether it is 
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possible to be critical of science without falling victim to the charge of 
irrationalism.  Is science the only legitimate model of human rationality?   
 
In order to address these questions, I will briefly consider the views of Jürgen 
Habermas with a view to presenting a more comprehensive understanding of 
modernity.  Of crucial importance to me is his attempt to broaden our 
understanding of reason, by emphasizing the dialogical-communicative 
dimensions of human existence as the medium of reason in society.  For 
Habermas, communication on all levels is crucial to understanding and correctly 
interpreting the “lifeworld” (or various forms of social interaction).  By including 
the views of Habermas, I hope to contribute to a more balanced approach to an 
understanding of modernity.  In this regard, I will proceed as follows:  
 
· Diverse views on the subject of modernity’s status  (5.2) 
· Habermas’s attitude towards modernity (5.2.1) 
· Discourse as an alternative approach to understanding  
modernity (5.3)   
             
5.2 Diverse views on the subject of modernity ’s status 
MacIntyre’s attitude toward the question of morality and his conviction that the 
Enlightenment Project had failed, has contributed extensively to an extremely 
important philosophical debate on the nature and true significance of modernity, 
involving some of the most important thinkers of our day, including Habermas.  In 
this regard, MacIntyre’s own critical evaluation of modernity has covered a wide 
variety of subjects, including ethics, history, and politics.  MacIntyre’s major 
contribution to this debate is the view that modernity has promised more than it 
can deliver insofar as it has failed to provide a rational justification for its faith in 
(scientific) reason as the only reliable standard of progress, knowledge and truth.  
It is this failure, according to MacIntyre, that has led to the profound moral 
uncertainty, so characteristic of modernity.  According to him, this condition of 
moral uncertainty has become extremely problematic given modern society’s 
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failure to provide a common frame of reference for dealing with matters that are 
ethically challenging, such as abortion, the just war, to mention but a few 
examples.  According to MacIntyre, the malaise within contemporary ethical 
thinking is especially evident when one considers that the subjects of modernity 
are not even capable of agreeing on the most basic terminology when they enter 
into debate on various moral issues.  The individual is left to his or her own 
devices, at it were; he or she becomes a law unto himself or herself.  The self-
legislating autonomous (rational) moral agent of Kantian ethics, who ought to be 
governed by the “moral law” in terms of which other human beings are treated as 
ends, rather than a means to an end, has degenerated into a self-absorbed 
individual, incapable of respecting the other person as a fellow human being.  
This state of affairs points to a profound crisis at the root of modernity’s self-
interpretation; the possible redemption of modernity lies in its ability to produce 
thinkers with the ‘moral resources that transcend the immediate crisis, which 
enable them to say to the culture what the culture cannot … say to itself’. 
(MacIntyre 1979: 16)   
 
There are opposing viewpoints in respect of modernity’s strengths and 
weakness.  There are those who claim, as Habermas does, that modernity 
remains an “unfinished project” (Tate 1997: 295) since its objectives have not yet 
been realized.  Habermas’s position on this enterprise will be discussed in a later 
section (point 5.2.1).  As a result of these differences in outlook, a variety of 
approaches have been introduced to make sense of what has been taking place 
in recent times.  These methods reveal a continuing search to find solutions to 
the endless problems created not only by the Enlightenment Project.  Gadamer’s 
“method” of philosophical hermeneutic, for example, is aimed at achieving 
understanding through interpretation and application within many practical 
situations.  Another example is Habermas’s thesis of intersubjectivity, which has 
sought to encourage unity and interaction among individuals through 
communication and dialogue and in the process be receptive to what is really 
happening in our lifeworld.  Consequently, it seems appropriate to regard the 
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contemporary epoch as an introduction to realizing the significance of the 
consciousness of discourse, as opposed to “rule” theories.  The reason for this is 
that prominent thinkers utilize open discourse to get in touch with the numerous 
complexities of existence.  Therefore, whether agreement is reached or not, the 
continuing exchange of ideas indeed illustrates that changes are occurring.  
Furthermore, dialogue brings greater awareness and understanding to all cultural 
groups so that consensus might be arrived at as a result of the new (dialogical) 
consciousness as a redemptive theme in the shared project of trying to come to 
terms with modernity.  It should be kept in mind that many philosophers, as well 
as men and women of literature during the Enlightenment era, were 
unsympathetic towards many of the new doctrines since they have claimed that 
many aspects of transformation within modernity have caused unnecessary 
conflict and suffering.  In this regard, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, 
for example, claim in their joint publication, The Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1972), that the ‘suspicion lurks that the Enlightenment project was doomed to 
turn against itself and transform the quest for human emancipation into a system 
of universal oppression in the name of human liberation’. (Harvey 1989: 13)  
Whilst being highly appreciative of the significance of the condemnation of 
modernity articulated by the earlier generation of thinkers associated with the 
“School of Frankfurt”, Habermas, however, defends the view that modernity can 
still be salvaged.   
 
Modernity has also come under fire from representatives of “postmodern 
thinkers”, such as Richard Rorty (1980), J-F. Lyotard (1984), Michel Foucault 
(1970), and Jacques Derrida (1976).  Even though the postmodernists seem to 
agree with the modernist rejection of past traditional practices, they question the 
modernist assumption of philosophical universalism implicit in the model of 
scientific rationality.  In place of scientific rationality, the postmodern thinkers 
have sought to introduce a mode of “aesthetic thinking” aimed at overcoming the 
structures of domination and oppression that has accompanied the development 
of the Enlightenment Project.  At the root of the postmodernist critique is a total 
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rejection of reason as the appropriate means of emancipation (from domination) 
and freedom.  This is why “art” is celebrated in the postmodern form of critique; it 
is believed that “art” will succeed where “reason” has failed.  The postmodernists’ 
aesthetic response stems from an underlying disenchantment with modernity’s 
failure to fulfill its promise of radical social transformation in the name of (an 
enlightened and an enlightening) reason.  On the subject of reason as a means 
of acquiring all knowledge, it is interesting to note that the postmodernists warn 
against too much preoccupation with instrumental reasoning as they argue that it 
is reason within modernity that has been (and continues to be) the condition of 
the possibility of human suffering, as witnessed for instance at Auschwitz. 
(Adorno 1973: 361-408)  Moreover, they maintain that instrumental reasoning 
should be replaced by a more authentic expression of freedom which, alas, can 
only be achieved, according to postmodern thinking, in the realm of “free play”, 
the realm of the “imagination”, that ultimately takes the form of engaged “writing” 
against all forms of “terror” that have found expression in the “totalitarian” forms 
of ideology in which “science” has been privileged as the centre of rationality, 
progress and truth.  According to Lyotard:   
 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much 
terror as we can take.  We have paid a high enough price for the 
nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the 
concept and the sensible, of the transparent and communicable 
experience.  Under the general demand for slackening and 
appeasement, we can hear the muttering of the desire for a return 
to terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize reality.  The 
answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the 
unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of 
the name. (Lyotard 1984: 82)   
 
A direct consequence of Lyotard’s critique of modernity is the celebration of 
“difference” in and through “language” other than the hegemonic “language of 
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science”.  The “other” language has its origins in the cultural life of the 
community.  Whilst modernism sought to identify with the single language (of 
science), postmodernism aims at the protection of the “lifeworld”, defined as the 
expression of pluralism and difference.  For a postmodern thinker such as 
Derrida, the critique of modernity takes the form of a “deconstruction” of the 
metaphysical tradition of modern philosophy, in view of overcoming, if at all 
possible, the oppositional form of thinking that privileged the “familiar” at the 
expense of the “unfamiliar” in an effort to legitimate the domination of the “other” . 
(Derrida 1982: 109-136)  Furthermore, the technique of critical analysis of 
language and text stresses the importance of the relational qualities, but more 
importantly, it stresses the oppressive structural elements inherent in the 
Enlightenment Project where the language of science is viewed as the 
paradigmatic expression of reason.  Against the hegemonic discourse of 
scientific rationality, the language of the community somehow rings “more true” 
given its spontaneity and authenticity; it “roots” within the community.  Within the 
community, languages actually seem to take on a life of their own, hence, 
enabling novel ways of interactive communication and expression, which merge 
with a traditional reservoir of language use, the combined effect of which is the 
knowledge of the community’s self-conscious freedom to define itself and to 
authenticate its existence on its own terms.  Despite the postmodern thinkers' 
emphasis on “other languages” as the condition of the possibility of freedom, 
Habermas however, even though he shares their view on the emancipatory 
potential of the “linguistic turn” in contemporary philosophical thinking, does not 
believe that the postmodern approach can deliver on its promise of freedom.  
According to Habermas, postmodernism is a form of “false consciousness”, of 
“psuedo-radicalism” which, is the latest articulation of conservatism, given its 
inability to effect “real” change in the “real” world. (Habermas 1981: 13-14)  For 
Habermas the problem of modernity is not an overemphasis on reason, but 
rather a deficit of reason in view of modernity’s leveling of reason to the domain 
of scientific-technical thinking. (Habermas 1985: 192-216)  We now proceed to 
 94 
discuss more fully the philosophical nature of Habermas’s views on the question 
of modernity. 
 
5.2.1 Habermas’s attitude towards modernity  
In contrast to MacIntyre’s claim that irreconcilable ethical disagreements have 
contributed significantly to the failure of modernity, Habermas’s outlook 
represents a more positive approach as he alleges that these very arguments 
and counterarguments actually illustrate the controversial nature of the 
“philosophical discourses of modernity”. (Tate 1997: 285)  John W. Tate basically 
defends a similar position when he asserts that modernity is a ‘process of critical 
evaluation and justification and conceives of modernity less as an objective 
historical period than as a normative process with prescriptive ends or goals’. 
(Tate 1997: 307)  In addition, an interesting distinction between MacIntyre’s and 
Habermas’s attitude regarding the Enlightenment’s conception of reason is 
observed.  While MacIntyre argues that knowledge cannot be solely founded on 
reason, Habermas is of the opinion that the reasoning process passes through a 
number of stages and can be validated in “normative terms” and so encompass a 
foundation for its legitimacy.  As a result of this standpoint, upholding the 
Enlightenment aspirations for advancement, based on reason, is vital for ‘critical 
independence and [the] capacity of (communicative) reason‘. (Tate 1997: 304)   
 
Similar opinions held by both MacIntyre and Habermas come to the fore in their 
respective objections to issues, such as, increased specialization in the 
workplace, which has resulted in a form of management control that normally 
isolates the individual from the end product.  They also agree on the failure of 
modernity to distinguish between practical and technical facets; they believe that 
no culture, even though it is scientifically orientated can be exempted from 
practical philosophy without causing difficulties.  This view implies that if ‘no 
attempt is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerning 
the practical control of their destiny, its place is taken by the attempt to attain 
technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an 
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attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical’. (Bernstein 1983: 43)  A 
further distinction between MacIntyre and Habermas is their outlook concerning 
emotivism.  According to MacIntyre, this theory was a primary contributing factor 
in the moral crisis of our times, and has led to the failure of the Enlightenment 
enterprise.  However, it is worthy to note that, even though Habermas is not 
supportive of emotivism as such, he maintains that it too can contribute 
something to a more in-depth understanding on how individuals reason.   
 
Entrenched in the Enlightenment’s reasoning is the fact that, if an investigation is 
unlikely to be founded on universal standards and fixed criteria, then there is no 
logical rationale that enables a person either to assert that something is superior 
or question whether something is “true”.  On the other hand, MacIntyre argues 
that since it is known that everyone does make comparative judgements and also 
that without mutual principles and shared activities, understanding would not be 
possible; modern society ought to be constructed along guidelines that reflect 
this basic understanding.  It is vital, therefore, to remember that no era of history 
is so different that an appraisal cannot be made, since people do, to some 
extent, share a common frame of reference; for instance, the custom of saying 
prayers can surely be understood by others.   
 
It is interesting to note that while Habermas is aware that a variety of negative 
political and economic experiences have their origin in the process of 
modernization, he is nonetheless more accepting of modernity’s current 
challenges and pathologies than MacIntyre.  Habermas contends that there is a 
mode of evaluation and interpretation of the enterprise of modernization that 
moves beyond criticism towards understanding through open dialogue.   
 
It seems to be the case that Habermas’s position regarding the Enlightenment 
enterprise can perhaps best be described as a novel perspective because, 
despite his recognition of the “dark side of the Enlightenment legacy”, (Bernstein 
1984: 31) he still offers modernity the real possibility of redemption.  In this 
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regard, Bernstein points out that ‘[t]he project of modernity, the hope of 
Enlightenment thinkers, is not a bitter illusion, not a naïve ideology that turns into 
violence and terror, but a practical task which has not yet been realized and 
which can still orient and guide our actions’. (Bernstein 1984: 31)   Regardless of 
the fact that he is aware that logical positivism, emotivism, and the triumph of 
instrumental reason all have their origins in the systematic ambiguities of the 
Enlightenment Project, Bernstein recognizes, in support of Habermas, that we 
need to preserve the truth implicit in this enterprise and reconstruct its 
emancipatory potential and quest for knowledge and justice.  He (Habermas) 
proposes to achieve this through dialogue since he maintains that:   
 
For it is only in and through dialogue that one can achieve self-
understanding.  If dialogue is not to be an empty impotent ideal, 
then a transformation and reconstruction of the social institutions 
and practices in which dialogic communication is embedded 
becomes a practical imperative. ( In Bernstein 1984: 12)   
 
Within this setting, for Habermas, modernity is indeed a project that has not yet 
been realized.  It is not simply a time of sociological transformation, emancipation 
and a break from prior historical times but also a venture that assists humankind 
in becoming more enlightened.  Due to the relentless nature and changing 
circumstances of modernity, however, there exists the never-ending challenge for 
modernity to redeem itself and establish an environment that could perhaps 
provide unifying standards.  From this perspective Tate (1997: 295) claims that it 
is possible to comprehend why Habermas perceives that modernity is an 
“unfinished project” since he ‘continues the Enlightenment focus on a normative 
conception of reason as the source of emancipation and reform, in contrast to a 
conception of reason as an instrumental mode of rationalization and control’. 
(Tate 1997: 295)   
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With reference as to how people tend to explain a situation, however, it is 
interesting to note that past experiences are normally invoked as a normative 
context for the justification and explanation of present actions and decisions.  
Therefore, based on the fact that individuals find it necessary and frequently 
significant to give some form of explanation or justification it is observed that it is 
“natural” to ground arguments or discussions on past experiences, thoughts or 
events within a specific setting.  This in itself is an indication, as maintained by 
MacIntyre, that not only are historical factors intertwined with social practices, but 
also that a frame of reference is a necessary feature of any form of interaction, 
and as a consequence, it is illogical that modernity completely excludes the past.  
From another angle, Habermas reasons that the contemporary period should be 
regarded as ‘the break brought about with the past as a continuous renewal’. 
(Tate 1997: 287)(Emphasis, Tate’s)  This observation obviously indicates that a 
proviso should be in place that generates an environment that facilitates constant 
rethinking about changing factors that are clearly very important to progress.   
 
According to Bernstein, the reason why Habermas’s research has become so 
significant with regard to recent discussions on modernity is that ‘he addresses 
himself to what many of us still believe, or want to believe: that it is possible to 
confront honestly the challenges, critiques, the unmasking of illusions; to work 
through these, and still responsibly reconstruct an informed comprehensive 
perspective on modernity and its pathologies’. (Bernstein 1984: 25)  A unique 
characteristic of modernity is that it is always in a state of “becoming” its own 
legitimacy, that is, modernity has constantly to reinvent itself since everything is 
open to review and investigation, in view of the fact that it is not reliant on former 
suppositions – or so it is claimed.  Habermas seems to support the latter claim 
when he writes:   
 
Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it 
takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch;  it 
has to create its normativity out of itself.  Modernity sees itself cast 
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back upon itself without any possibility of escape. (Habermas 1987: 
7)(Emphasis, Habermas’s)   
 
The passage above seems to suggest the possibility that modernity can 
legitimate and justify its validity strictly on its own terms.  This may well be the 
central claim of the modernist agenda, but is it possible to do so?  Habermas 
seems to be saying “yes and no”, which may be interpreted as a moment of 
indecisiveness on the part of Habermas.  More to the point, however, is the fact 
that Habermas is making allowances for the historical dimensions of human 
existence within the paradigm of modernity.  This stance makes it possible for 
Habermas to redeem or validate morality within a context what is deemed to be a 
“modern setting” while, at the same time, advocating a process of remembrance 
or recollection of the historical events that have had a decisive impact on the 
development of modern society.  Habermas’s commitment to modernity must 
therefore take into account the decisive experiences of our collective historical 
consciousness, which, in his case, would certainly be the so-called “German 
question”. (Wolin 1989: ix)  Historical denialism and revisionism have certainly 
played their part in trying to soften the reality of the “German question”; for 
Habermas, however, it is important that the supporters of Nazism  “come to terms 
with the past”, that is, to acknowledge (openly and honestly) what really 
happened in Nazi Germany.  Implicit in this acknowledgement is the hope of 
transcending the socio-political conditions that made “Auschwitz possible”.  
Richard Wolin (ibid.) addresses this aspect of Habermas’s thought as follows:   
 
For the development of a healthy, nonpathological identity would 
seem contingent on the forthright acknowledgement of those 
aspects of the German tradition that facilitated the catastrophe of 
1933-1945.  And this is why recent efforts on the part of certain 
German historians – bolstered by an era of conservative  
stabilization – to circumvent the problem of “coming to terms with 
the past” are so disturbing . (Wolin 1989: ix)    
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As can be seen above, Habermas’s theory of history commits him to a “practical”, 
that is, moral-political engagement aimed at overcoming problems of domination, 
oppression and genocide.  History is not something that is “handed down” to the 
next generation in a pure or unmediated form; its interpretation depends very 
much on how we see the present and the future.  If we can foresee a future free 
from racial discrimination, cultural domination, economic exploitation, gender 
violence – to mention but a few problems – the moral-political inspiration for such 
a future originates within the tragedy and pain of our past.  For Habermas, history 
is never completely innocent since it serves as a continual reminder of where we 
have “gone wrong”.  It is the non-acknowledgement of where we have “gone 
wrong” that remerges in the form of the “pathology of modernity”.  In this regard, 
Habermas informs us that his ‘problem is a theory of modernity, a theory of the 
pathology of modernity, from the viewpoint of the realization – the deformed 
realization – of reason in history’. (In Bernstein 1985: 4)  If we disregard our 
moral-political (“practical”) engagement with the past, history takes on the  
“innocent” form of a positivistic account of “the facts” (“historicism”), with a view to 
normalizing the present, with no regard for the future.  Normalizing the present 
usually takes the form of “letting bygones be bygones”; it works against the spirit 
of (mutual) understanding, and the past is reduced to a matter of (my) opinion.  If 
I choose to deny the holocaust, then my opinion should be respected.  Modernity 
is, after all, the age of freedom of expression.   
 
Habermas draws on the model of philosophical hermeneutics, in order to 
overcome the problem of “historicism – its own hidden form of positivism”. 
(Bernstein 1984: 10)  As indicated above, Habermas is critical of the researcher, 
who holds the view that it is possible to interpret an event, yet, simultaneously 
suspend (bracket) our judgment and evaluation of certain historical events.  
According to Habermas this is not satisfactory since to understand and interpret 
some situation it is significant to ‘rationally evaluate the validity claims that are 
made by participants’. (Bernstein 1984: 10)  Within this context it is important to 
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know what motivates the “other” to engage in some actions and not in others 
because this usually is part of the data and therefore allows  for a more 
comprehensive mode of inquiry and understanding.  For Habermas, the process 
of understanding the “other” is a rational process.  It presupposes the possibility 
of reason (in history) as the condition of the possibility of dialogue-aimed-at-
reaching-understanding.  In spite of the pessimistic views regarding the 
Enlightenment Project and sceptical views about reason, Habermas remains 
optimistic.  He asserts that modernity’s dilemmas can be rationally resolved 
through practical tasks and fostering “communicative rationality”.  He points out 
that reason has “a stubbornly transcending power, because it is renewed with 
each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in 
solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving  emancipation.” (Bernstein 
1984: 25)   
 
According to Habermas, reason must not, however, be interpreted in the 
foundationalist terms of the modern metaphysical tradition, where absolute 
foundations of certainty (Descartes), or the a priori conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge (Kant), are assumed epistemologically to precede the question of 
truth.  For Habermas, the question of knowledge and truth necessarily takes the  
form of the uncertain (the fallibilistic), of the hypothetical, and the idea of the 
“fallible” is especially applicable to questions of moral truth within the 
consciousness of the community.  As Bernstein explains, ‘[i]n the centrality of the 
idea of a fallibilistic critical community, and in the probing of the dynamics of 
intersubjectivity, he discovered the kernel of what he was to later call 
“communicative action” – action oriented to mutual understanding’. (Bernstein 
1984: 3)  For Habermas, ‘[r]eason, freedom, and justice were not only theoretical 
issues to be explored, but practical tasks to be achieved – practical tasks that 
demanded passionate commitment’. (Bernstein 1984: 2)   
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5.3 Discourse as an alternative approach to understanding modernity 
Communication is the key to mutual understanding.  It is from this perspective 
that Habermas tries to develop a rational model of intersubjective communication 
(dialogue) aimed at reaching understanding with others.  The intersubjective 
model of dialogue presupposes the exchange of ideas between, at least, two 
individuals eager to understand each other.  The possibility of reaching 
understanding implies the moral impetrative of acknowledging the “other” as an 
equal partner-in-dialogue. The human process of reaching understanding, which 
Habermas attempts to formulate in his theory of “communicative action”, must be 
distinguished from the more “strategic” form of communication, which is but a 
means of achieving a particular extrinsic goal. The strategic form of 
communication, although the most popular (because it is particularly effective in a 
modern world geared towards personal – individualistic-ambition and personal 
goals) is, for Habermas, a secondary form of communication.  It has, however 
been elevated to the primary form of communication, given modernity’s emphasis 
on the instrumental form of rationality, the domain of science and technology.  It 
is this overemphasis on the instrumental form of rationality, which Habermas 
identifies as the major cause of the “pathology of modernity” (In Bernstein 1984: 
4); it destroys the “practical” form of rationality, which is the realm of moral and 
political coordination and human solidarity.  Habermas writes: 
 
But, of course, the real difficulty in the relation of theory to practice 
does not arise from the new function of science as a technological 
force, but rather with the fact that we are no longer able to 
distinguish between practical and technical power. Yet even a 
civilization that has been rendered scientific is not granted 
dispensation from practical questions; therefore a particular danger 
arises when the process of scientification transgresses the limit of 
technical questions, without departing from the level of reflection 
confined to the technological horizon.  For then no attempt at all is 
made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens 
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concerning the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by 
the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the 
administration of society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it 
is unhistorical. (Habermas 1974: 255) 
 
According to Habermas, all “practical” questions are geared towards reaching 
understanding with the others.  This process of reaching understanding is, for 
Habermas, the primary form of communication.  For as long as modernity 
continues to privilege the “strategic” form of communication, its pathology will 
continue to undermine the very thing that makes human moral-political 
coexistence possible, meaningful and non-pathological, namely, human 
understanding.  For Habermas, the process of understanding starts at the birth of 
the individual, and carries on right up to the moment of death.  For as long as we 
allow the process of understanding to be devalued and neglected within the 
context of modernity, the full potential of modernity as a product of human 
rationality, will never be realized.  
 
It is to Habermas’s credit that he recognizes a universal potential for rationality in 
humankind’s “natural” capacity for speech.  It is the capacity for communication 
that enables humankind to lay claim to the rational, and it is the historical nature 
of human existence that leads Habermas to speak of “reason in history” .  
(Bernstein 1985: 4)  Habermas is of the view that all conversation aimed at 
reaching understanding, draws implicitly on a range of claims whose validity may 
either be accepted or questioned by those involved in a particular conversation or 
debate.  If accepted, then the “normal” everyday life of everyday certainty 
continues in its “normal” routine, predictable and “certain” way.  If rejected, 
mutual understanding is temporarily suspended until valid reasons, capable of 
convincing the dialogue-partners, have been found.  The general acceptance of 
valid reasons will restore consensus, and the “normal” will resume its customary 
role in our everyday lives.  If, however, all the familiar, conventional patterns of 
explanation and validation fail, the process of communication can either break 
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down completely, or move to a higher level of “discourse”, where the dialogue 
partners are acutely aware that they are  entering a realm of the hypothetical, 
where uncertainty is not necessarily interpreted as a sign of ignorance or 
stupidity, but rather a sign of our human fallibility as human beings in the face of 
certain questions, which have lost their familiar consensual context of 
justification.  From the perspective of discourse, Habermas distinguishes 
between the “active” and the “reflective” dimensions of human existence.  
Whereas the active has to do with the familiar world that we tend to take for 
granted, the reflective “transcends” the world of action, when the latter can no 
longer provide justifiable “reasons to act”.  It should be noted that Habermas is 
not referring here to a mystical realm “outside and beyond” the reach of ordinary 
thought; he is certainly not trying to rehabilitate the Platonic allegory of the cave, 
although the Platonic distinction between “mere opinion” and “true knowledge” 
must certainly have been at the back of his mind.  What Habermas is more 
concerned with, however, when he speaks of discourse, is the more “mundane” 
idea that reason, upon realizing the inadequacies and limitations of certain 
arguments, is potentially capable of reflecting upon itself, and of transcending its 
own conceptual products.  Habermas explains the importance of “discourse” as 
follows:    
 
Discourse helps test the truth claims of opinions (and norms) which 
the speakers no longer take for granted. In discourse, the “force” of 
the argument is the only permissible compulsion, whereas 
cooperative search for truth is the only permissible motive.  
Because of their communicative structure, discourses do not 
compel the participants to act.  Nor do they accommodate 
processes whereby information can be acquired.  They are purged 
of action and experience.  The relation between discourses and 
information is one where the latter is fed into the former.  The 
output of discourses … consists in recognition or rejection of 
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problematic truth claims.  Discourses produce nothing but 
arguments. (In Bernstein 1976: 110)   
  
Habermas accordingly distinguish between the realm of communicative action, 
aimed at mutual understanding, on the one hand, and discourse, which is an 
open-ended process of thinking, where the truth claims of the world of 
communicative action have been problematised and questioned.  In both cases it 
is the rational that presupposes the possibility of continued dialogue.  Habermas 
claims that communicative action is essential to understanding and interpretation 
on all levels through intersubjective meaning, which is created by the use of 
language among individuals.  An abstract concept, such as, happiness is not only 
an attribute but describes feelings and reactions that is part of what is implied by 
saying that this person is in a certain frame of mind.  Hence, interpretation and 
understanding are mutually agreed upon from the observation of similar 
paradigms of interactions.  In addition, communicative action normally takes into 
account moral and practical responsibility of an agent that includes acceptable 
standard practices as well as rational actions that are logically true and 
consistent with empirical knowledge.   
 
Taking into account the structure of modernity’s rationale, Habermas argues that 
validity claims are involved in communicative action as a means to reach 
understanding about diverse interpretations.  Interpretation is absolutely essential 
to discover the complexities of meaning in which actions and utterances have a 
function in concrete situations.  Since attention is focussed on the conversation of 
all participants, issues related to the conditioning and motivation of both the 
subject and inquirer’s lifeworld should be part of the investigation.  Moreover, 
valid norms are morally obligatory because of the relationship between the 
interaction of society and members during communicative action.  Habermas 
argues that this guideline originates from an exchange of ideas in a practical 
manner.  The crucial role that validity claims play in Habermas’s thinking is 
reaffirmed when he claims that:   
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Validity claims … they transcend any local context; at the same 
time, they have to be raised here and now and be de facto 
recognized.  … The transcendental moment of universal validity 
burst every provinciality asunder; the obligatory moment of 
accepted validity claims renders them carriers of context-bound 
everyday practice.  … a moment of unconditionality is built into 
factual processes of mutual understanding – the validity laid claim 
to is distinguished from the social currency of a de facto established 
practice and yet serves as the foundation of an existing consensus. 
(Habermas 1990: xvii)(Emphasis, Habermas’s)   
 
Unlike MacIntyre, for whom modernity is “doomed to failure”, for Habermas, 
modernity has yet to fulfill its potential.  For Habermas, modernity has to be 
understood in terms of three fundamental forms of rationality: they are “cognitive-
instrumental” (the scientific), “morality-practical” (the moral-political), and 
“aesthetic-expressive” (aesthetic). (Habermas 1981: 8)  It is when we fail to keep 
these three, fundamentally distinct forms of rationality, separate that we fall into 
simplistic evaluations of modernity, where we absolutise one of the three at the 
expense of the other two, thereby disturbing the “balance” of modernity’s rational 
potential, by leveling modernity to only one of its dimensions.  Advocating a 
broader conception of reason, one in which science does not have the monopoly 
lies at the root of Habermas’s interest in modernity.  He refers to the modern 
obsession with science as a form of “logocentricism”, where the “object” of 
knowledge overshadows the knowledge-seeking “subject”.  Habermas’s 
conception of rationality seeks to take us beyond the “subject-object” model of 
rationality that forms the basis of “scientific thinking”.  With regard to the critique 
of the logocentric leveling of modernity, Habermas writes:   
 
Western logocentricism [is taken] as an indication of the exhaustion 
of our philosophical discourse and a reason to bid adieu to 
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philosophy as such.  This way of reading the tradition can not be 
maintained if philosophy can be transformed so as to enable it to 
cope with the entire spectrum of aspects of rationality – and with 
the historical fate of a reason that has been arrested again and 
again, ideologically misused and distorted, but that also stubbornly 
raises its voice in every inconspicuous act of successful 
communication.  Such a transformation is possible only if 
philosophy does not remain fixated on the natural sciences. (In 
Bernstein 1985: 197)   
 
In distinguishing between the three different forms of reason, Habermas is in fact 
following Kant’s differentiation between the “theoretical reason”, “practical 
reason”, and the faculty of “judgment”.  As Habermas (1990: 18) puts it, Kant 
‘separates the faculties of practical reason and of judgment from that of 
theoretical knowledge, and he places each of them on its own foundation’. 
(Habermas 1990: 18)  It is in terms of Kant’s conceptual differentiation that 
Habermas therefore pleads for the redemption of modernity in terms of a more 
comprehensive development of the modern subject.  Beyond the world of 
science, which is a world in which everything (nature and human beings) has 
been reduced to the level of an object lies “more reason”.  For as long as we 
continue to associate reason exclusively with science, as MacIntyre and the 
postmodern thinkers do, we will willy-nilly condemn the human being to suffer as 
a helpless victim in a modern world whose freedom has turned out to be a never-
ending nightmare of domination and exploitation – the inevitable products of 
logocentric thinking.  Habermas, (ibid.) asserts, “logocentricism means neglecting 
the complexity of reason effectively operating in the life-world, and restricting 
reason to its cognitive -instrumental dimension (a dimension, which we might add 
has been noticeably privileged and selectively utilized in processes of capitalist 
modernization”.   
 
 107 
Habermas’s interpretation of modernity as an “unfinished project” certainly takes 
into account the historical dimensions of the modern subject.  In this regard, he 
has something in common with MacIntyre.  Unlike MacIntyre, however, he does 
not believe that we can turn our back on modernity, not even for the sake of a 
thought experiment aimed at making looking back nostalgically at a pre-modern 
Aristotelian Greek city-state as a model of social, moral and political solidarity 
and coordination.  In the final analysis, it is not the reflection on tradition alone 
that will make modernity overcome its pathology, but a commitment to a future 
society that we can “rationally” and freely commit ourselves to in the spirit of 
cooperation and mutual understanding as equal partners.  Like the postmodern 
thinkers, such as Lyotard, Habermas fears the nightmare of political domination, 
terror and violence, as evoked in the moral symbolism that we have come to 
associate with Auschwitz.  This does not mean that he will retreat into the relative 
security of aesthetic “free play”, where the imagination is allowed to break all the 
rules, while leaving the “real world” relatively untouched.  Beyond the loss of 
credibility towards “metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv-xxv), aimed at ensuring 
universal support for our collective ideals, Habermas proposes the notion of a 
“postmetaphysical” conception of reason in history, where the ideals that we 
pursue collectively are not so much the stuff that can be converted into reality, 
but rather the normative context for evaluating our progress and development in 
the “present”.  It is in this sense that Habermas speaks of modernity as the “here 
and now”, the transitory, as the inescapable arena of freedom and enlightenment .   
 
5.4 Conclusion    
What is particularly unique about human interaction and communication, as a 
result of modern thinking, is the emergence of the phenomenon of common 
discourse, where non-verbal and verbal actions are translated into 
understanding, along with the recognition that practical and moral activities are 
essential to a meaningful form of social life.  It is through participation in shared 
dialogue that opportunities are revealed, that a lifeworld of unlimited possibilities 
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exist, where self-expression and transformation are able to take place at every 
stage of human development as people regularly explore unknown realms, so as 
to meet cultural chalenges as well as extend their awareness about reality and 
discover truth and so overcome the usual limiting perspectives.  This, of course, 
also reinforces MacIntyre’s notion that our background, history and our intentions 
shape the human condition.  Therefore, from the examination of the 
aforementioned philosophers, it can be undeniably stated that, despite their 
differences, there is a parallel theme throughout their writings, namely, an 
endeavour to promote general transparency and intelligibility as people 
interrelate and communicate with each other.  And, most important is the view 
that there is no single approach to gain knowledge either in the natural or the 
human sciences.  Despite the controversies surrounding modernity’s self-
definition, it is significant to bear in mind that every participant’s contributions 
towards genuine discussion about whether modernity is successful or not, should 
be understood and interpreted as a step towards further enlightenment that 
undoubtedly might enable future generations to survive in a more meaningful 
manner.  And, in pursuing Habermas’s alternative approach, it certainly seems 
that this is possible.   
 
 
 109 
Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
A fundamental feature that distinguishes modernity from other historical times is 
its persistent and deliberate choice to reject the past.  As a cultural-historical 
phenomenon, modernity has been preoccupied with trying to define the 
parameters of its self-understanding, especially in view of the tremendous impact 
of major events such as, amongst others, the Industrial and French Revolutions.  
Modernity’s self-understanding is rooted in a radical self-consciousness of a new 
age, a new beginning, based on its radical departure from the traditions of the 
past.   
 
This new beginning has certainly introduced an element of profound uncertainty 
into the “project of modernity” in view of the general acceptance tha t the past has 
lost its moral significance, and the present has yet to define its moral orientation.  
In response to the need for spiritual guidance and certainty in the present, 
modernity has elevated “reason” to the spiritual status once accorded to “God” in 
pre-modern, traditional society.  According to the modern outlook, reason (as the 
highest authority) must provide spiritual guidance in human affairs in a society in 
which science is seen as the paradigmatic expression of knowledge and 
progress.  Liberated from the authority of tradition, the individual may now 
proclaim “his” autonomy and independence as the legislator of the “universal” 
principles of human understanding.   
 
Never before has the autonomous individual played such a central and powerful 
role in human society.  For MacIntyre, however, the project of modernity has 
brought about serious predicaments since moral principles are either 
nonexistent, or solutions to moral dilemmas are arbitrarily decided upon, given 
the central importance accorded by modernity to the emotivist doctrine of ethics.  
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In this chapter, I will present a general summary and a few concluding remarks 
on a debate whose main arguments have proved to be, at once, elusive, difficult, 
obscure, challenging, but certainly impossible to dismiss as philosophically 
inconsequential.   
 
6.2 Summaries  
For the purpose of understanding MacIntyre’s critique of modernity it is essential 
to be familiar with the background from which this epoch has emerged.  As I 
have shown in Chapter Two, the Scientific Revolution is generally regarded as 
confirmation of reason’s alleged triumph over superstition, prejudice and 
ignorance – the standard obstacle to knowledge and progress.  The privileging of 
reason, its elevation to the status of the “highest authority” is the distinguishing 
mark of modernity’s self-definition.  From this perspective, the application of 
reason to the human affairs of politics and morality has presupposed that reason 
can provide the ultimate justification for accepting science as the only legitimate 
source of rationality and truth in a world that can no longer “turn back”.  
Modernity is therefore committed to a world of “change”, and change” becomes 
the “highest” virtue of “modern man”.   
 
Prominent figures, such as, Descartes, Newton and Kant have contributed 
significantly to the development of this new reasoning consciousness.  Whilst 
acknowledging the relevance of reason and its accomplishments in the natural 
sciences, it is well-known that MacIntyre has been critical of a general application 
of a mechanistic methodology to all forms of human reasoning.  For MacIntyre, a 
distinctive shortcoming of modernity is its central focus  and privileging of an 
instrumental form of rationality.  In spite of the fact that Newton’s revolutionary 
scientific theories have contributed extensively to a scientific methodological 
approach, this does not mean that the” human spirit” can be captured within the 
mechanistic model of scientific thinking.  MacIntyre argues that it is the 
interpretation of human beings as “instruments” and isolated “agents” in the 
context of modernity that has promoted the disintegration of morality, thereby 
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contributing to the increasing dehumanization of modern society.  That the 
scientific community has viewed human beings in this manner might seem rather 
ironic when one remembers that the Enlightenment Project’s noble aspirations 
are supposedly meant to find expression in humanistic ideals.  With reference to 
Descartes’s aim, his approach is indicative of a philosophical attempt to arrive at 
“absolute certainty” as the foundation of the type of “true” knowledge assumed to 
be capable of banishing all superstition, prejudice and ignorance, once and 
forever, from human consciousness.  Descartes method of doubt, aimed at 
overcoming all doubt, bears witness to the optimistic spirit of modernity as the 
privileged centre of rational enlightenment and progress. The modern 
philosopher’s supreme challenge and greatest responsibility lie in providing a 
philosophical foundation for accepting the scientific-technical-mathematical as 
the only legitimate path to knowledge.   
 
As far as Kant is concerned, it should be recognized that he not only plays a very 
central role in establishing the principles of that era , but that he also went further 
and brought about new options into philosophical thinking as demonstrated by 
his conception of pure reason.  In his “critical philosophy”, he tries to capture the 
a priori  principles of human reason in his attempt to demonstrate that all 
knowledge starts  with a process of reasoning which, although dependent on 
sense experience for the content of its knowledge, must look to reason itself for 
the ultimate principles that will enable us, not only to have knowledge, but also to 
understand the “universal” conditions for the possibility of knowledge.  It is the 
self-conscious application of these “universal” conditions of knowledge that 
elevates “rational man” above “his” dependence on all illegitimate forms of 
authority, including the authority of the past.  Kant’s call for enlightenment implies 
that modern “man” must overcome “his” immature dependence on the “false 
gods” of pre-modern (read pre-rational) society.  As in the case of Descartes’s 
philosophy, Kant’s philosophy is also an attempt to legitimate modernity’s 
supposed independence from the traditions of the past.   
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As a result of the modern philosopher’s claim of intellectual independence, the 
modern world is a place of challenge and dread.  On the one hand, it is filled with 
infinite possibilities; on the other hand, it is characterized by unforeseen conflict 
and uncertainty.  The aftermath of the Cartesian-Kantian approach has been the 
absolutisation of “scientific” reason.  A question that is repeatedly asked is 
whether humanity can depend exclusively on the laws of scientific reasoning to 
find solutions to all its moral dilemmas?  Can science offer a moral reason for 
taking a particular stance?  For example, despite the progress of scientific 
methods, can science actually provide ethical justification for engaging in genetic 
engineering?   
 
In spite of the new dilemmas that have originated during the so-called 
enlightened epoch, and the resultant precariousness of the modern individual, 
modernity is ‘unified by the  common belief that reason [can] transcend 
contingency to establish universal “truths” and thus guarantee progress’. (Tate 
1998: 9)  Kant supports this statement when he says that ‘reason must subject 
itself to constant self-criticism, so as to determine the limits of its own authority 
and thereby provide the basis of its own legitimacy’. (Tate 1998: 9-10)   
Modernity is characterized by its progressive nature that is focussed on the future 
as the temporal horizon of its unrealized possibilities.  As a consequence of this 
state of affairs, modernity’s task is to “create its normativity” from its own 
sources. (Habermas 1987: 7)(Emphasis, Habermas’s)   
 
It is paradoxical that the modernity, whose basic objective is to attain certainty, 
should nevertheless be preoccupied so extensively with radical change on 
account of its dismissal of former times.  In this regard, it must be concluded that 
the only certainty is that uncertainty (change) is an integral aspect of 
humankind’s lifeworld.  Therefore, armed with a new consciousness, embraced 
by enlightened thinking, individuals need not be opposed to or fearful of change 
or uncertainty as these phenomena merely mean, on the positive side, that 
unlimited possibilities exist.   
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MacIntyre’s critical analysis of modernity is presented in a thought-provoking  
style and it is apparent that he is deeply concerned about the absence of what he 
takes to be a worthwhile life.  A very important aspect of MacIntyre’s thinking is 
his steadfast belief that the Enlightenment era has in fact failed, and that its 
failure was unavoidable once the individuals of modernity have discarded their 
“essential human nature or function” (Kitchen 1997: 81), that is, their potential to 
realize their telos as human beings, filled with a sense of dignity, meaning and 
purpose.  For MacIntyre, modernity’s dissociation from its historical past has also 
deprived it of the benefit o f the wisdom of past, which still has a lot of relevance  
for “modern man’” in “his” quest for meaning.  It is in response to the deficit of 
meaning in modern life that MacIntyre has attempted to establish a rational 
foundation for moral and political truth so that modern society may function as a 
meaningful and coherent “whole”.   
 
Although I refer throughout this thesis to MacIntyre’s views on the moral 
pathology of modernity, his critical appraisal of modernity is specifically stated in 
Chapter Three.  A major aspect of his objections is related to the theory of 
emotivism.  He declares that this theory has contributed decisively to the failure 
of the Enlightenment Project.  The gist of MacIntyre’s critique of the emotivist 
approach is that personal preferences have become the sole basis of the 
process of decision making , and judging whether some action or perspective is 
acceptable or not very often depends on arbitrary and subjectivistic 
interpretations.  The (modern) theories of utilitarianism and relativism are, for 
MacIntyre, philosophical expressions of the arbitrary and subjectivistic nature of 
modern ethical thinking.   
 
With the aim of rehabilitating society’s moral thinking and counteracting the 
shortcomings of modern culture, MacIntyre has set out, as shown in Chapter 
Four, to demonstrate that an Aristotelian type of ethics is required to rediscover 
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modernity’s moral potential for the good life.  According to MacIntyre, the value of 
the Aristotelian ethical tradition lies in the importance that it attaches to a 
communal way of life.  MacIntyre would like to see a similar cohesive social 
pattern informing the modern cultural tradition.  MacIntyre’s critique of the 
modern theory of liberalism must therefore be seen as an extension and critical 
appropriation of his appreciation for the communitarian basis of the Aristotelian 
ethical system of thought.  In this regard, he exp resses his disapproval of 
liberalism as he asserts that our “liberal democratic rulers” (Kitchen 1997: 72) 
have in actual fact promoted the loss of values by replacing values with a rule-
organized culture , and by placing excessive emphasis on material rewards.  As 
far as the liberal tradition’s conception of freedom is concerned, it is important to 
understand that whilst freedom does give one a sense of independence, freedom 
devoid of a sense of respect for the “other” as a human being is meaningless.   
 
MacIntyre contends furthermore that, in order for a social structure to be secure , 
general respect for traditional values and customs are very important.  He argues 
that modernity ought to acknowledge its  debt to the past especially in view of the 
fact that ‘we cannot escape our historicity, our social identities, nor the traditions 
which inform our lives – including the tradition of the Enlightenment’. (Bernstein 
1986: 40)  It should be pointed out, however, that MacIntyre’s call for a general 
acknowledgement of our debt to the past must not be interpreted as in invitation 
to devalue the “here and now”; as far as he is concerned modernity is a reality 
and there is no escaping it.  The challenge for MacIntyre is to show how to 
reconcile the idea of tradition with the idea of modernity when, to all intents and 
purposes the respective ideas of modernity and tradition are by definition 
incompatible.  The challenge lies, furthermore, in accepting the priority accorded 
to the power of reason as the defining feature of the paradigm of modernity.  In 
this regard, I have tried to illustrate that MacIntyre’s tendency to equate reason 
with the scientific-instrumental form of thinking, results in his inability to recognize 
and develop reason’s potential to bring about the moral regeneration of 
modernity.  It is only when scientific thinking is given the monopoly on the scope, 
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status and validity of human rationality that I might accept MacIntyre’s position 
that modernity is doomed to failure.  It is precisely my disagreement with 
MacIntyre on this point that I have sought to present an alternative evaluation of 
the (“incomplete”) project of modernity, as exemplified in the work of Habermas 
(Chapter Five).   
 
In my view, Habermas’s theory of communication, and the normative implications 
of his ideas concerning dialogue and discourse, certainly offers a powerful 
alternative to MacIntyre’s interpretation of modernity.  For Habermas, our 
capacity for speech is the most basic and most significant indication of human 
reason.  Reason has its origin in the communicative potential of all human 
beings.  When realized, the development of reason into the abstract language of 
scientific discourse constitutes, for Habermas, just one aspect of human reason.  
Equally important should be the development of reason in the domain of ethical 
thinking.  Since the objectives and character of the two types of thinking are 
radically different, Habermas accordingly distinguishes between “theoretical” and 
“practical” reason, as two forms of thinking that have their roots in the “pre-
scientific” mode of ordinary (everyday) thinking, that is, the lifeworld where the 
past really matters to the people who live in the present, and who are destined to 
die sometime in the future.  Preceding the individuals’ moments of life and death, 
is the historical life of the community, defined as an inexhaustible source of 
wisdom as we negotiate our way towards a future that really matters, because it 
makes sense to us – as autonomous (rational) human beings.   
 
6.3 Final Conclusion 
MacIntyre’s philosophy is based on the evaluation of ethical theories that are 
operative within the modern context and which also reflect past achievements.  
He examines a broad spectrum of subjects in order to demonstrate his 
philosophical beliefs that human lives are constantly affected by diverse events, 
especially those of a historical and cultural nature.  There are a number of 
options that he tries to explore in the hope of finding a solution for the prevalent 
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incoherent scenario that he claims modern life has turned out to be.  In this 
regard, he reflects critically on the epistemic status of traditional norms and 
values with a view to generating a coherent sense of the “self and society”, 
based on principles of human dignity and respect.  Although, initially it might 
appear that MacIntyre wishes to return to the past, this is not really the case, 
since his primary objective is to reclaim a good life within contemporary society.  
MacIntyre certainly holds the view that social stability depends on our willingness 
to be guided by the past.  He defends this point of view by claiming that within 
groups that are less exposed to the modern way of life , it seems that these 
communities are more stable and more harmoniously integrated.  According to 
MacIntyre, these “traditional” communities hold the key to our survival within 
modernity, because without the “good life”, that is, human solidarity in the 
present, we do not have much of a future.   
 
Although it can be argued that to revert to traditional practices is not a viable 
option, it must be appreciated that modern society currently does require 
solutions for its moral dilemmas.  On a more positive note, regarding MacIntyre , it 
can be stated that his approach, as important as it is, should not be allowed to 
cloud our judgment on the practical possibility of modernity’s promise of a “better 
life”.  Taking into consideration, MacIntyre’s opinion that modernity has failed to 
provide moral direction, we would do well to remember Habermas’s words that 
modernity must not be written off, but should rather be viewed as an “incomplete 
project”.  The importance that we attach to the ideal of harmony, when combined 
with the need for justice, implies that conflict will remain a constant feature of 
human society.  In our common quest for the “good life”, we wo uld do well to 
heed Bernstein’s words:   
 
The problem today is how we can live with the conflict and tension 
between the “truth” implicit in the tradition of the virtues and the 
“truth” of the Enlightenment.  … This is the deepest problem with 
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which we must live after virtue. (Bernstein 1986a: 140)(Emphasis, 
Bernstein’s)   
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